How (Not) to Raise Money

Goeree, Jacob K.; Maasland, Emiel; Onderstal, Sander; Turner, John L.

doi:10.1086/431288

Cited by 159 publications

(186 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Amongst these, Moldovanu and Sela (2001) study the best way to split prize money in a contest, and Gavious, Moldovanu and Sela (2002) analyze contests, where depending on the nature of the cost function bid caps may be more pro…table or not. While, Goeree et al (2005) rank lotteries and contests mentioned otherwise, everyone is given an equal chance. We call a ra-e a lottery where chances are sold.…”

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confidence: 99%

Manna from Heaven or Forty Years in the Desert: Optimal Allocation without Transfer Payments

Chakravarty

Kaplan

2006

SSRN Journal

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Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return. This may pose a di¢ cult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs or when discriminating among agents using known di¤erences is not a viable option. In this paper, we …nd an optimal mechanism to allocate goods when the designer is benevolent. While the designer cannot charge agents, he can receive a costly but wasteful signal from them. We …nd conditions for which ignoring these costly signals by giving agents equal share (or using lotteries if the goods are indivisible) is optimal. In other cases, those that send the highest signal should receive the goods; however, we then show that there exist cases where more complicated mechanisms are superior. Finally, we show that the optimal mechanism is independent of the scarcity of the goods being allocated.

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confidence: 99%

Manna from Heaven or Forty Years in the Desert: Optimal Allocation without Transfer Payments

Chakravarty

Kaplan

2006

SSRN Journal

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“…As a result contributions towards financing the public good increase in comparison to voluntary contribution. This type of result is also robust with respect to different modifications and extensions of the model, for instance, risk-averse consumers considered in Duncan (2000), increasing group size analyzed in Pecorino and Temimi (2007), endogenized prize value introduced in Lange (2006), and incomplete information (under simplified linear public good preferences) with one prize in Goeree et al (2005) and multiple prizes in Faravelli (2011). However, most of these extensions share one limitation with the framework of Morgan (2000): any prize sum of finite value is never sufficient to finance and provide the efficient amount of the public good.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 68%

On the Efficient Provision of Public Goods by Means of Lotteries

Franke

Leininger

2013

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily refl ect those of the editors. Terms of use: Documents in Ruhr Economic Papers #399

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“…For a detailed discussion, we appeal, again, to the above cited survey literature. 9 A later published variant, Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal, and Turner (2005), is less related to the present work because, there, the payment rules do not exhibit an 'all-pay-all' structure. 10 The parameters (α, β, δ, θ) are the coefficients of the winner's and loser's linear payoff functions in Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (2005).…”

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confidence: 76%

All-pay-all aspects of political decision making

Giebe

Schweinzer

2013

Public Choice

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. All-pay-all Aspects of Political Decision Making Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe study decision making processes with non-standard all-pay structures. We motivate this interest through a group of regulatory, political, legal, military, and economic applications where individual actions determine the consequences for a larger group or the public. The common features of these examples are a competitive environment, winner-take-all reward structure, and some form of all-pay-all payment rule.JEL-Code: C700, D700, L500.

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How (Not) to Raise Money

Cited by 159 publications

References 14 publications

Manna from Heaven or Forty Years in the Desert: Optimal Allocation without Transfer Payments

Manna from Heaven or Forty Years in the Desert: Optimal Allocation without Transfer Payments

On the Efficient Provision of Public Goods by Means of Lotteries

All-pay-all aspects of political decision making

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