How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891

Gillman, Howard

doi:10.1017/s0003055402000291

Cited by 157 publications

(79 citation statements)

References 68 publications

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“…Evidence from the United States includes ideologically progressive, rights-oriented expansion and contraction of the judicial agenda (Epp 1998) and court jurisdiction (Gillman 2002(Gillman , 2008. Comparative evidence includes variants of similar movements in Canada, Britain, and India (Epp 1998), neoliberal judicial elites in Israel, Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand (Hirschl 2000(Hirschl , 2004, and progressive judges in Spain (Hilbink 2007b), Israel (Woods 2008), Mexico (Ingram 2012b), and Brazil (Engelmann 2004;Ingram 2009).…”

Section: Why Judicial Network?mentioning

confidence: 99%

'Networked Justice: Judges, the Diffusion of Ideas, and Legal Reform Movements in Mexico'

Ingram

2012

SSRN Journal

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two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. I am also grateful for ongoing collaborations with Lisa Hilbink, whose influence-in good network fashion-shaped many of the ideas presented here, and to James Fowler, for opening his research group during a fellowship at UC San Diego in [2009][2010]. Lastly, I thank the judges of Michoacán: without their participation none of this would be possible. The University of Massachusetts Dartmouth Chancellor's Office and the Joseph P. Healey Endowment provided support for data collection. The Kellogg Institute provided writing support. ABSTRACTExisting research shows that the ideas of judges matter for judicial behavior both on the bench (decision making) and off the bench (lobbying and mobilization for institutional change). Yet there is little empirical evidence regarding the content and distribution of these ideas and even less evidence and fewer theoretical propositions regarding the manner in which ideas transfer or diffuse among judges. Addressing these empirical and theoretical gaps, I survey judges in the Mexican state of Michoacán and apply techniques of network analysis. The project makes four main contributions: (1) original data on the attitudes of judges regarding prominent institutional and jurisprudential changes shaping the legal landscape in Mexico; (2) egocentric data on network structure for the sampled judges; (3) sociocentric data on network structure at the level of judicial district, state supreme court, and entire state generated by aggregating the egocentric data; and (4) a mixed-methods analysis of the causal relationship between network features and judicial attitudes, drawing on egocentric methods, sociocentric methods, and personal interviews with focal individuals. Complementing literatures on political socialization, policy diffusion, and complex systems, the analysis clarifies our understanding of the role of judicial networks in strengthening democracy and the rule of law. RESUMENInvestigaciones existentes demuestran que las ideas de los jueces motivan el comportamiento judicial dentro de los juzgados (en la toma de decisiones) y fuera de estos (en el cabildeo institucional y las movilizaciones en torno a distintas reformas). Sin embargo, existe poca evidencia empírica en cuanto al contenido y la distribución de estas ideas, y aun menos evidencia y teorías sobre el modo en que las ideas se transfieren o difunden entre los jueces. Para dar cuenta de estas limitaciones empíricas y teóricas en la literatura, este trabajo desarrolla una encuesta a jueces en la entidad federativa mexicana de Michoacán, aplicando técnicas de análisis de redes. El proyecto hace cuatro contribuciones principales: (1) datos originales sobre las actitudes de jueces en cuanto a cambios importantes en las instituciones y la jurisprudencia que moldean el paisaje jurídico mexicano; (2) datos ego-céntricos sobre la estructura de redes entre los jueces encuestados; (3) datos socio-céntricos sobre la estructura de redes judiciales a nivel de distrito judicial, tribunal super...

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Section: Why Judicial Network?mentioning

confidence: 99%

'Networked Justice: Judges, the Diffusion of Ideas, and Legal Reform Movements in Mexico'

Ingram

2012

SSRN Journal

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“…The seminal works in this literature include Whittington (2007Whittington ( ,2005, Gillman (2006Gillman ( , 2002, Pickerill & Clayton (2004), Clayton & May (1999), Lovell (2003, Frymer (2003Frymer ( , 2007, McMahon (2004), Hirschi (2004), Ginsburg (2003, Sweet (2000), Graber (1993), Lasser (1988, and Dahl (1957).…”

Section: The Counterma]oritarian Difficulty Reviledmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to Constitutional Order

Graber

2008

Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci.

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This review documents how scholarly concern with democratic deficits in American constitutionalism has shifted from the courts to electoral institutions. Prominent political scientists are increasingly rejecting the countermajoritarian difficulty as the proper framework for studying and evaluating judicial power. Political scientists, who study Congress and the presidency, however, have recently emphasized countermajoritarian difficulties with electoral institutions, Realistic normative appraisals of American political institutions, this emerging literature on constitutional politics in the United States maintains, should begin by postulating a set of democratic and constitutional goods, determine the extent to which American institutions as a whole are delivering those goods, and either explain how the political system as a whole might be redesigned to better deliver those goods or accept second-best constitutional goods that can actually be delivered by some attainable combination of political institutions,

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“…Rather, they are meant to show the response mechanisms available to energized majorities. As with most new theories involving the counter-majoritarian difficulty (Graber 1993;Gillman 2002;Lovell 2003), the timeframe is admittedly limited. But also similar to All these cases show the Court issuing a ruling that aligns with Liberal Democratic preferences, despite the fact 3 that Republicans made a number of appointments to the Bench.…”

Section: Case Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Holding the Accountability Problem Accountable: Response Mechanisms to Counter-Majoritarian Decisions

Bridge

2016

ARP

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If the Supreme Court rules against the wishes of the majority, how can that majority respond? I argue that while federal judges will never stand for election, majorities can employ various response mechanisms to counter-majoritarian decisions. I draw out observable expectations for inter-branch, local, and electoral responses. I then test these expectations in cases from the “mature” New Deal—communism, school prayer, busing, and abortion—showing the range of effective results achieved by anti-Court majorities. Given these results, I conclude that there is no “accountability problem”; there is just a narrow definition of accountability.

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How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891

Cited by 157 publications

References 68 publications

'Networked Justice: Judges, the Diffusion of Ideas, and Legal Reform Movements in Mexico'

'Networked Justice: Judges, the Diffusion of Ideas, and Legal Reform Movements in Mexico'

The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to Constitutional Order

Holding the Accountability Problem Accountable: Response Mechanisms to Counter-Majoritarian Decisions

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