2021
DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2021.1897510
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How powerful CEOs adopt antitakeover provisions?

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Cited by 2 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Although previous studies also use CEO pay slice as an alternative measure to capture CEO power (Baker et al. , 2019; Lee et al. , 2022), we are unable to replicate this same proxy in the Brazilian setting.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 70%
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“…Although previous studies also use CEO pay slice as an alternative measure to capture CEO power (Baker et al. , 2019; Lee et al. , 2022), we are unable to replicate this same proxy in the Brazilian setting.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 70%
“…On the one hand, under the managerial entrenchment view, powerful CEOs can exercise more control over corporate policies, facilitating the adoption of anti-takeover provisions, such as poison pills, to strengthen their job security and obtain private benefits (Lee et al. , 2022).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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