How pretence can really be metarepresentational

Meini, Cristina; Voltolini, Alberto

doi:10.1007/s11299-009-0068-z

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…In a systematic review of the literature on play, Barton (2010) commented that the definitions regarding functional play are diverse, suggesting that at times functional play has been considered under the heading of pretend play and at other times as a separate category. This is possibly the result of an ongoing meta-representational debate regarding the thoughts the child holds during the play actions they complete (Jarrold, Mansergh, & Whiting, 2010;Leslie, 1987;Meini & Voltolini, 2010;Stich & Tarzia, 2015). Within the current study there is recognition that some metarepresentation may be necessary to engage in some higher characteristics of functional play.…”

Section: Autism and Functional Playmentioning

confidence: 73%

We don’t play that way, we play this way: Functional Play Behaviours of Children with Autism and Severe Learning Difficulties

Hancock

2020

Research in Developmental Disabilities

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Section: Autism and Functional Playmentioning

confidence: 73%

We don’t play that way, we play this way: Functional Play Behaviours of Children with Autism and Severe Learning Difficulties

Hancock

2020

Research in Developmental Disabilities

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“…For details on this, along with my preferred version of metarepresentationalism, cf. Meini-Voltolini (2010). tional kind of imagination, one must not only imagine that scenario, but also represent a real scenario and metarepresent that the two representations concern different scenarios.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Nature of Fiction/al Utterances

Voltolini

2016

Kairos. Journal of Philosophy &Amp; Science

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In this paper, first of all, I want to try a new defense of the utterance approach as to the relationship between fictional and nonfictional works on the one hand and between fictional and nonfictional utterances on the other hand, notably the idea that the distinction between fictional and nonfictional works is derivative on the distinction between fictional and nonfictional utterances of the sentences that constitute a text. Moreover, I want to account for the second distinction in minimally contextualist semantic terms. Finally, I want to hold that what makes a fictional utterance, hence a fictional work, properly fictional is the contextually pre-semantic fact that its utterer entertains an act of make-believe, where such an act is accounted for in metarepresentational terms. This ultimately means that the fiction/nonfiction distinction is not clarified in terms of the fictional works/nonfictional works distinction, for things rather go the other way around.

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“…For details on that, cf. Meini and Voltolini (2010 the effect that by imaginatively referring to something in a dream, there is an oneiric entity one is really referring to. A fortiori, no constitutive rule grounding the generation of such an entity has been thereby expressed.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…No way 38 Cf. again Meini-Voltolini (2010). of seeing the imaginary process occurring in dreaming as involving a certain set of properties takes place in such a case. A fortiori, there is no correct way of seeing that process that leads to the generation of an oneiric individual.…”

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A Suitable Metaphysics for Fictional Entities

Voltolini¹

2015

Fictional Objects

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There is a list of desiderata that any good metaphysics of fictional entities should be able to fulfill. These desiderata are: 1) the nonexistence of fictional entities; 2) the causal inefficacy of such entities; 3) the incompleteness of such entities; 4) the created character of such entities; 5) the actual possession by ficta of the narrated properties; 6) the unrevisable ascription to ficta of such properties; and 7) the necessary possession by ficta of such properties. (Im)possibilist metaphysics uncontroversially satisfy 1) and 2); Neo-Meinongian metaphysics satisfy 1), 2), 3), 5), 6), and 7); artefactualist or creationist metaphysics uncontroversially satisfy 1), 2), 3), and 4). Another metaphysics is needed in order to satisfy all such desiderata. In this chapter I develop such a metaphysics, claiming that a Syncretistic metaphysics that combines Neo-Meinongianism with Artefactualism achieves this purpose. According to Syncretism, ficta are hybrid entities individuated in terms of both a certain makebelieve narrative process and the set of properties that one such narration mobilizes. Toward the end of the chapter I consider some possible criticisms to this approach: its non-intuitiveness; ficta's unnecessary proliferation; and troubles with creationism of any sort.

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How pretence can really be metarepresentational

Abstract: Pretence, Metarepresentation, Simulation, Simulation theory, Theory theory,

Cited by 6 publications

References 41 publications

We don’t play that way, we play this way: Functional Play Behaviours of Children with Autism and Severe Learning Difficulties

We don’t play that way, we play this way: Functional Play Behaviours of Children with Autism and Severe Learning Difficulties

The Nature of Fiction/al Utterances

A Suitable Metaphysics for Fictional Entities

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