This paper projects how much incremental wind energy development (WED) may occur without causing inadequate investment incentives (aka missing money) for wind generation and natural-gas-fired generation in the day-ahead market (DAM) and real-time market (RTM) of the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) in the US. Using a large sample of hourly data for the 82-month period of 01/01/2014 -10/31/2020, it documents that the DAM's hourly investment incentives move with (a) the day-ahead forecast of daily natural gas price; (b) MISO's day-ahead hourly requirements of ancillary services; (c) MISO's zonal day-ahead hourly schedules of nuclear generation, wind generation, and must-run generation; and (d) MISO's zonal day-ahead forecasts of hourly loads. Findings based on the RTM's hourly data tell a similar story. Further, the negative effect of incremental WED on investment incentives over the forward-looking period of 2023-2042 is offset by the positive effect of rising natural gas price, nuclear plant retirement, declining must-run generation, and growing demand. In the extreme case of nuclear plant retirement and zero must-run generation, incremental WED of up to ~441% of the existing wind generation level may occur as a market-based outcome without missing money in MISO's DAM.