How Sanctions Affect Public Opinion in Target Countries: Experimental Evidence From Israel

Grossman, Guy; Manekin, Devorah S.; Margalit, Yotam

doi:10.1177/0010414018774370

Cited by 56 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 42 publications

(47 reference statements)

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“…Our analysis, therefore, cannot tell us whether external threats and endorsements affect public opinion in the same way when the two countries in question are on friendlier terms. Indeed, other studies find that external pressure only generates a public backlash when the sending state is viewed as an unfriendly state (Grossman, Manekin, and Margalit 2018; Gruffydd-Jones 2019). Thus, it may be the case that the Chinese public would be more likely to support accommodation when threatened by a state viewed as a friend of China.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Individuals are more likely to favor a policy when informed that the policy is supported by a political party that they favor (Brader and Tucker 2012; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Guisinger and Saunders 2017) or by a trusted and neutral international organization (Grieco et al 2011; Linos 2013). While individuals respond favorably to endorsements from credible and trustworthy elites, the opposite may occur when the endorser is perceived as a hostile “outsider” with different interests or values—whether that is a national political party that one dislikes (Samuels and Zucco 2014) or a hostile foreign country (Bush and Jamal 2015; Grossman, Manekin, and Margalit 2018; Gruffydd-Jones 2019). External threats therefore provide new information to citizens about the policy preferences of foreign actors.…”

Section: Explaining Public Responses To External Threatsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although our findings are based on a single policy issue in one country, they make two important theoretical contributions to our understanding of economic coercion. First, they add to a small, but growing, literature that finds foreign threats also backfire when it comes to public opinion in other issue areas such as foreign security policy (Grossman, Manekin, and Margalit 2018; Frye 2019) and human rights (Gruffydd-Jones 2019; Bush and Jamal 2015). To our knowledge, this study provides the first evidence that coercive tactics have remarkably similar effects on public opinion in the domain of economic policy.…”

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confidence: 99%

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The Impact of Economic Coercion on Public Opinion: The Case of US–China Currency Relations

Gueorguiev

McDowell

Steinberg

2020

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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In recent years, the United States has increasingly tried to change other governments’ economic policies by threatening to punish those countries if they do not change course. To better understand the political consequences of these tactics, this paper examines how external threats influence public support for policy change in targeted states. We consider three mechanisms through which economic coercion might alter public opinion: by changing individuals’ interests, by activating their national identities, and by providing them with new information about a policy’s distributive effects. To test these rival explanations, we focus on the case of China–US currency relations. Using data from a survey experiment of Chinese internet users, we find strong support for the informational updating theory. Our evidence suggests that economic coercion can reduce support for policy change because it leads individuals to update their beliefs about who wins and loses from economic policy changes.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Explaining Public Responses To External Threatsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Impact of Economic Coercion on Public Opinion: The Case of US–China Currency Relations

Gueorguiev

McDowell

Steinberg

2020

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…Sanctions reinforce nationalist sentiments and make citizens more susceptible to government propaganda (Galtung, 1967). This likely increases hostility against the sender country (Grossman, Manekin and Margalit, 2018), and may even encourage citizens to engage in collective action in favor of the government (Hellmeier, Forthcoming) or to use politically motivated cyberattacks (cf. Holt et al, 2017).…”

Section: Sasley 2011)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Digital Retaliation? Denial-of-Service Attacks After Sanction Events

Lutscher¹

2020

Preprint

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Cyberattacks have been portrayed as a widely used new coercive weapon for interstate conflict. While one strand of the literature agrees with this statement, other works contend. Using new data on cyberattacks measured from Internet traffic, this paper tests these claims empirically by investigating whether sanctions lead to an increase in Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks on the sender countries. Following previous literature, this increase may be due to targeted states that respond with DoS attacks to both the imposition and, even more so, the threat of sanctions as a coercive tool. However, I argue that an increase may also simply reflect DoS attacks launched to voice discontent. For the analysis, I run time series models from 2008 -- 2016 for the United States and the European Union as the most active sanctioning entities. The results show only some evidence for an increase of DoS attacks on the sender state when sanctions are imposed. Sanction threats appear to be unrelated to the development of DoS attacks. These findings support previous theoretical work that questions the coercive use of cyberattacks, suggesting that governments do not frequently use DoS attacks as a foreign policy instrument.

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“…Whether sanctions are effective in inducing compliance is a different question:Grossman et al (2018) find that the EU's labelling of products from the West Bank -in the relative short-termproduced a backlash in Israel and increased support for hardline policies. Similarly,Peeva (2019) suggest that sanctions against Putin following the Crimea annexation actually backfired and helped Putin's approval ratings.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump's Trade Wars

Fetzer

Schwarz

2019

SSRN Journal

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We use the recent trade escalation between the US, China, the European Union (EU), Canada and Mexico to study whether retaliatory tariffs are politically targeted. Using aggregate and individual-level data we find evidence that the retaliatory tariffs disproportionally targeted areas that swung to Trump in 2016, but not to other Republican candidates. We propose a novel simulation approach to construct counterfactual retaliation responses. This allows us to both quantify the extent of political targeting and assess the general feasibility. Further, the counterfactual retaliation responses allow us to shed light on the potential trade-offs between achieving a high degree of political targeting and managing the risks to ones own economy. China, while being constrained in its retaliation design, appears to put large weight on achieving maximal political targeting. The EU seems successful in maximizing the degree of political targeting, while at the same time minimizing the potential damage to its own economy and consumers.

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How Sanctions Affect Public Opinion in Target Countries: Experimental Evidence From Israel

Cited by 56 publications

References 42 publications

The Impact of Economic Coercion on Public Opinion: The Case of US–China Currency Relations

The Impact of Economic Coercion on Public Opinion: The Case of US–China Currency Relations

Digital Retaliation? Denial-of-Service Attacks After Sanction Events

Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump's Trade Wars

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