2011
DOI: 10.1007/s00285-011-0430-8
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How small are small mutation rates?

Abstract: We consider evolutionary game dynamics in a finite population of size N. When mutations are rare, the population is monomorphic most of the time. Occasionally a mutation arises. It can either reach fixation or go extinct. The evolutionary dynamics of the process under small mutation rates can be approximated by an embedded Markov chain on the pure states. Here we analyze how small the mutation rate should be to make the embedded Markov chain a good approximation by calculating the difference between the real s… Show more

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Cited by 100 publications
(106 citation statements)
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“…In this example, the approximation by π seems to be fairly accurate for ≤ 10 −4 . A theoretical investigation of the quality of this type of approximation in a related model has recently been carried out by Wu et al (2011).…”
Section: Numerical Examplesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this example, the approximation by π seems to be fairly accurate for ≤ 10 −4 . A theoretical investigation of the quality of this type of approximation in a related model has recently been carried out by Wu et al (2011).…”
Section: Numerical Examplesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The quantities π x are payoff functions [26]. In contrast to the fitness functions f x employed in the other updating rules considered here, these payoff functions may take negative values.…”
Section: Link Dynamicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The error induced by that assumption has been previously studied by Wu et al [26]. Their study employs the Fermi process as updating rule on a well-mixed model of population size N. Of particular interest is their result for coexistence games, in which the best reply to every strategy is a different strategy.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Yet, experimental studies have revealed that many natural systems exhibit frequency-dependent selection [4][5][6], which means that an individual's fitness not only depends on its genotype, but also on its interactions with other individuals and hence on the frequency of the different genotypes in the population. Although such frequency-dependent selection had already been studied early by Crow & Kimura [3], only recently has it received more attention [7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14]. In these theoretical and computational studies, individuals' interactions are represented by interaction matrices from game theory.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%