How street‐level dilemmas and politics shape divergence: The accountability regimes framework

Abstract

Hierarchical accountability often proves insufficient to control street‐level implementation, where complex, informal accountability relations prevail and tasks must be prioritized. However, scholars lack a theoretical model of how accountability relations affect implementation behaviors that are inconsistent with policy. By extending the Accountability Regimes Framework (ARF), this paper explains how multiple competing subjective street‐level accountabilities translate into policy divergence. The anti‐terrorism “Prevent Duty” policy in the United Kingdom requires university lecturers to report any student they suspect may be undergoing a process of radicalization. We ask: what perceived street‐level accountabilities and dilemmas does this politically contested policy imply for lecturers, and how do they affect divergence? An online survey of British lecturers (N = 809), combined with 35 qualitative follow‐up interviews, reveals that accountability dilemmas trigger policy divergence. The ARF models how street‐level bureaucrats become informal policymakers in the political system when rules clash with their roles as professionals, citizen‐agents, or “political animals.”