How Strong Is the President in Government Formation? A New Classification and the Czech Case

Kopeček, Lubomír; Brunclík, Miloš

doi:10.1177/0888325418770737

Cited by 9 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…As we show, historically it dates all the way back to Masaryk’s founding of the former Czechoslovakia. Put simply, the relative weight of the three presidents has constantly overrun the constitutional expectations of prime ministers (PMs) and their governments (Hloušek, 2015; Kysela et al, 2007; Kindlová, 2018; Kopeček & Brunclík, 2018). As this article makes clear, the de facto strong Czech presidency vis-à-vis the government has played the key role in programming crucial tropes of Czech geopolitics.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Running in Place: “Czeching” out the W/E(a)stern Performative Presidential Geoprostitution

Hynek,

Moravec

2023

Alternatives: Global, Local, Political

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This article attempts to explain the Czech Republic’s geopolitical vacillation between the West and East over the past three and half decades. We tie this behavior, where one orientation never prevails permanently, to the continuity of political elites from the communist to the post-communist periods. In addition to general relevance, we discuss its implications for the country’s recent reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The focal points of this analysis are the geopolitical discourses and practices of three consecutive presidents: Václav Havel, Václav Klaus, and Miloš Zeman, each marking a decade in the Czech presidential office. We provide a historical-structural context to show that the Czech case has been an important example of a small state with its security continuously compromised by the hierarchical penetrations of great powers: Nazi Germany, the USSR/Russia, and most recently, China and the United States. Yet, as we demonstrate, the Czech Republic cannot be considered a stereotypical victim with mixed-sovereignty agreements being imposed on it. We present the three presidents in their active roles of geopolitical architects vis-à-vis the great powers as well as the Czech government. Heuristically, we conceptualize presidential foreign-and-security activities as performative geoprostitution. We show that for Havel, the primary act of geoprostitution was institutionalizing a civilizational client-patron relationship between a small state and a superpower (the United States). In contrast, not only was Klaus and Zeman’s performative geoprostitution different due to its Eastern orientation, but it was motivated by their self-importance and desire to carve out political legacies and greased by corrupted business interests.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Running in Place: “Czeching” out the W/E(a)stern Performative Presidential Geoprostitution

Hynek,

Moravec

2023

Alternatives: Global, Local, Political

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“…Baylis 1996;Brunclík -Kubát 2019); its specific aspects have been examined (e.g. Kysela -Kühn 2007;Havlík -Hrubeš -Pecina 2014;Kopeček -Brunclík 2019); and attention was eventually paid to the personality of the internationally well -known first Czech and last Czechoslovak president, Václav Havel, often in the broader context of the democratic transition (e.g. Skalnik Leff 1996; Keane 2001;Duberstein 2006;Zantovsky 2015;Williams 2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism: Czech presidents compared

Kopeček

2023

Politics in Central Europe

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This article analyses the use of powers by Czech presidents Václav Havel (1993–2003), Václav Klaus (2003–2013) and Miloš Zeman (2013–2023). The text is based on the concept of presidential activism, empirically examining mainly their interactions with governments and legislative vetoes. The results show that important incentives for presidential activism are non-cohesive coalition governments, minority governments, slim government majorities in parliament, the collapse of governments and a chaotic parliament. On the other hand, the internal cohesion of a government acts as a constraint on presidential activism. Popularly elected Zeman interpreted his powers much more widely in appointing and removing governments and ministers than Havel or Klaus, who were elected by parliament. By contrast, Zeman used his legislative powers less than his two predecessors, which was apparently influenced by their low success (with some exceptions) in this area. The president’s political proximity to the government was found to only sometimes limit his agility. Czech presidents have rarely been passive. A specific factor that affected activism, albeit only to a limited extent, was the poor health of Havel and Zeman at certain moments. To reduce systemic risks in the future, it would be useful to define more precisely the rules for appointing and dismissing a government and individual ministers.

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