How Superduper Does a Physicalist Supervenience Need to Be?

Wilson, Jessica

doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00127

Cited by 212 publications

(103 citation statements)

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“…Having originally proposed the subset account as a theory of realization specifically for functionalists, in which case y is treated as a functional property, he later recants, suggesting that the theory doesn't even require Y to be causally individuated. 18 On Wilson's (1999;2015) version of the subset theory, a multiply realized property bestows a proper subset of the powers of its realizer, and is weakly emergent according to (Weak). 19 Strictly speaking, Wilson doesn't offer the proper subset account as a theory of realization, but as a necessary and sufficient condition that theories of realization must meet if they are to be adequate to the needs of non-reductive physicalists.…”

Section: Functional Versus Qualitative Realizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Assuming that in general, properties are causally relevant by dint of the causal powers they bestow, the most obvious way for special sciences to secure autonomy is for dependent special science properties to bestow novel causal powers relative to the basic physical properties upon which they depend. However, the demands of a broadly physicalist worldview require that these properties are not only dependent on basic physics, but also in some appropriate sense physically realized (Horgan 1993;Wilson 1999;2015). Because realized properties are derivative, and in some sense nothing over and above their realizers, it's notoriously difficult to see how they could bestow causal powers that their realizers do not, whence a dilemma: it seems we must either give up autonomy, and with it the layered model; or give up physicalism, and replace physical realization with a mysterious emergence that allows dependent properties to bestow novel powers.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…3 Defenders of the layered model typically accept the causal inheritance principle, and argue that despite not bestowing novel powers, special science properties nonetheless exhibit enough causal novelty to be non-redundant, and enough causal unity to be nomic. According to the proper subset strategy, for instance, realized properties inherit their causal powers, but inherit only some of the powers of their realizers, which allows for both nomic unity and a limited form of causal novelty (Wilson 1999;Shoemaker 2001). 4 Such strategies promise the kind of causal-explanatory novelty required for special science autonomy without novel causal powers, but whether or not they deliver is a matter of considerable controversy.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Demystifying Emergence

Yates¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Are the special sciences autonomous from physics? Those who say they are need to explain how dependent special science properties could feature in irreducible causal explanations, but that's no easy task. The demands of a broadly physicalist worldview require that such properties are not only dependent on the physical, but also physically realized. Realized properties are derivative, so it's natural to suppose that they have derivative causal powers. Correspondingly, philosophical orthodoxy has it that if we want special science properties to bestow genuinely new causal powers, we must reject physical realization and embrace a form of emergentism, in which such properties arise from the physical by mysterious brute determination. In this paper, I argue that contrary to this orthodoxy, there are physically realized properties that bestow new causal powers in relation to their realizers. The key to my proposal is to reject causal-functional accounts of realization and embrace a broader account that allows for the realization of shapes and patterns. Unlike functional properties, such properties are defined by qualitative, non-causal specifications, so realizing them does not consist in bestowing causal powers. This, I argue, allows for causal novelty of the strongest kind. I argue that the molecular geometry of H 2 O-a qualitative, multiply realizable property-plays an irreducible role in explaining its dipole moment, and thereby bestows novel powers. On my proposal, special science properties can have the kind of causal novelty traditionally associated with strong emergence, without any of the mystery.A ccording to the layered model, our world is naturally divided into a hierarchy of levels, with basic physics at the bottom. Although higher-level properties and particulars are ultimately dependent upon and determined by basic physics, they are the subject matter of autonomous sciences. What does the autonomy of the so-called special sciences-chemistry, biology, neuroscience, psychology-consist in? According to a longstanding tradition, special science autonomy requires that the relevant higher-level properties feature in laws that

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Section: Functional Versus Qualitative Realizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Demystifying Emergence

Yates¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…One way to ensure this is to take the realization relation itself to illuminate how a realized property is metaphysically necessitated by its realizer. I take these to support the following methodological claim: a good theory of realization should provide the resources to explain how the instantiation of a realizer property metaphysically necessitates the instantiation of a property it realizes.6 In what follows, I will examine what is sometimes called "the subset view" of realization (Wilson 1999(Wilson , 2011Shoemaker 2001; with this theoretical constraint in the background. In other words, I will examine whether the subset view has the resources to explain how realized properties are metaphysically necessitated by their realizers.…”

Section: ***mentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal Powers and the Necessity of Realization

Baysan

2017

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

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Non-reductive physicalists hold that mental properties are realized by physical properties. The realization relation is typically taken to be a metaphysical necessitation relation. Here, I explore how the metaphysical necessitation feature of realization can be explained by what is known as "the subset view" of realization. The subset view holds that the causal powers that are associated with a realized property are a proper subset of the causal powers that are associated with the realizer property. I argue that the said explanation of the metaphysical necessitation feature requires a careful treatment of the relationship between properties and causal powers. ***Non-reductive physicalism is typically understood as the view that mental properties are realized by physical properties. What counts as a case of realization is widely disputed.1 According to a commonly-held view, realization is a relation between two properties, the realizer property P and the realized property Q, whereby something's having P somehow brings about its having Q. Surely, "brings about the instantiation of" is a predicate that can pick out many relations. What is distinctive about realization, according to the standard picture, is that such bringing-about is supposed to hold non-contingently and synchronically: If P realizes Q, then, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, if x is a bearer of P at a time t, then x is also a bearer of Q at t.On this understanding, if physicalism is true, insofar as x is a bearer of a physical realizer of a mental property M, there isn't anything that needs to be added to the intrinsic properties of x to make it the case that x has M. Thanks to taking realization as a metaphysical necessitation relation, we can easily distinguish a realization-based version of non-reductive physicalism from some non-physicalist views which also hold that mental property instances are brought about by physical property instances where such bringing-about holds only contingently.2 It 1 See Baysan (2015) for discussion of different accounts of realization.2 Noordhof (2003) persuasively argues for a related claim. As an example of such non-physicalist views, consider the view that phenomenal mental properties supervene nomologically, but not metaphysically, on physical properties (Chalmers 1996).

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“…Kim and Merricks need to make room for the 14 Shoemaker (2007) offers an account of realisation on which the causal powers of realised causes are a subset of the causal powers of their realisers. For an alternative, earlier version of the subset account see Jessica Wilson (1999Wilson ( , see also 2009). …”

Section: Both Kim and Merricks Appeal In Their Theories To The Pluralmentioning

confidence: 99%

Overdetermination and Elimination

Árnadóttir

2015

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

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I focus on two arguments, due to Jaegwon Kim and Trenton Merricks, that move from claims about the sufficiency of one class of causes to the reduction or elimi- nation of another class of entity, via claims about overdetermination. I argue that in order to validate their move from sufficiency to reduction or elimination, both Kim and Merricks must assume that there can be no ‘weak overdetermination’; i.e., that no single effect can have numerically distinct but dependently sufficient causes occurring at the same time. One problem for both arguments is that weak overdetermination isn’t obviously objectionable. That point has been well made before. But I want here to go further than merely shifting the burden of proof onto the advocates of overdetermination arguments. I want to tease out why they are so convinced that we must resist weak overdetermination and explain why their conviction is misguided. Both Merricks and Kim, I shall argue, ultimately rest their case on the same motivating principle, which I call the principle of additional causal powers. This principle, I argue further, should be rejected. It lacks argumentative support, and it begs the question against those at whom the arguments are directed

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How Superduper Does a Physicalist Supervenience Need to Be?

Cited by 212 publications

References 12 publications

Demystifying Emergence

Demystifying Emergence

Causal Powers and the Necessity of Realization

Overdetermination and Elimination

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