2016
DOI: 10.1177/2233865916667867
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How the size of governing coalitions shape legislative behavior: A subnational analysis of Argentine legislative chambers, 1992–2009

Abstract: In presidential democracies, minority governments are widespread and the size of the governing coalition varies dramatically across legislatures. Despite substantial variation across legislatures, no significant research has been conducted to explore how the size of the governing coalition shapes legislative behavior. We argue that executives supported by a legislative majority have the necessary resources to promote the party; consequently, members of the governing coalition are subject to less partisan press… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Local government with weaker opposition and higher coalition tend to be able to achieve higher local government performance accountability level. This finding is against our hypothesis and most of the studies in the literature (Barnes & Jang, 2016). Having majority legislative coalition that supports the executive is not always bad.…”
Section: Discussioncontrasting
confidence: 99%
“…Local government with weaker opposition and higher coalition tend to be able to achieve higher local government performance accountability level. This finding is against our hypothesis and most of the studies in the literature (Barnes & Jang, 2016). Having majority legislative coalition that supports the executive is not always bad.…”
Section: Discussioncontrasting
confidence: 99%
“…When political competition is low in which there are dominant parties, the legislative tends to be stronger so that the 35 supervision on local government financial management becomes lower. An executive with larger majority coalition support tends to shape higher opportunistic behaviour (Barnes & Jang, 2016). In contrast, the tighter political competition in which opposition is also strong, it can be expected to have a strict supervision on local government financial management (Araujo & Tejedo-Romero, 2016a;Caba Pérez, Rodríguez Bolívar, & López Hernández, 2014;Cohen & Leventis, 2013;García-Sánchez, Frías-Aceituno, & Rodríguez-Domínguez, 2013;García & García-García, 2010).…”
Section: Legislative Political Coalitionmentioning
confidence: 99%