How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design

Abstract

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Romanian pensions system at a glance: some equity comments

“…In addition, another solution (Cigno, 2010) to avoid a pension crisis would be an intelligent system design, by developing two main elements of the public pension system: a classical Bismarckian scheme in which the individuals receive pensions according to their contributions during their active life, and a second scheme that qualifies individuals to a pension by having children and spending time at home to raise them. However, the reality shows that there is a conflict between the economic rationale behind such a scheme and the simplicity required by the political process (Beetsma & Oksanem, 2008).…”

Human Capital, Intrinsic Motivation and Poverty of Elderly in Later Life

“…These adverse effects are exacerbated if the decline in fertility is accompanied by the increase in life expectancy. Therefore, there appears to be a consensus that pension expenditure has risen, partly because fertility has fallen, and the conventional response to this consensus argument is to raise the contribution and reduce benefits (see Cigno 2009). However, raising the contribution and reducing the benefits will place the government in a dilemma since the implementation is politically difficult and almost impossible.…”

The long-term determinants of marital fertility in the developed world (19th and 20th centuries): The role of welfare policies

“…Various researchers have discussed the influence which public policies have had on fertility rates since World War II (McDonald 2006;Vos 2009;Neyer 2013). In the relevant literature, several authors voice the opinion that the decrease in fertility is a consequence of the pension system (Van Groezen, Leers, and Meijdam 2003;Sinn 2007;Cigno and Werding 2007;Ehrlich and Kim 2007;Van Groezen and Meijdam 2008;Gahvari 2009;Cigno 2010;Fenge and von Weizsäcker 2010;Regös 2014;Boldrin, De Nardi, and Jones 2015). However, all these studies focus on periods later than 1960.…”