How to be an Infallibilist*

Dutant, Julien

doi:10.1111/phis.12085

Cited by 36 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…See (Douven, 2005). Thirdly, although Dutant (2007Dutant ( , 2016 defends a thesis that he calls "infallibilism," it is not the thesis discussed herewhich he rejects. 4 There is one rather popular response to the example based objection, which deserves mention.…”

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confidence: 89%

Infallibilism and Easy Counter-Examples

Davies

2018

Grazer Philos. Stud.

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Infallibilism is commonly rejected because it is apparently subject to easy counter-examples. The author describes a strategy that infallibilists can use to resist this objection. Because the sentences used in the counter-examples to express evidence and belief are context-sensitive, the infallibilist can insist that such counter-examples trade on a vacillation between different readings of these sentences. The author describes what difficulties await those who try to produce counter-examples against which the proposed strategy is ineffective.

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confidence: 89%

Infallibilism and Easy Counter-Examples

Davies

2018

Grazer Philos. Stud.

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“…(Given the mild assumption that if it's rational to believe "If I don't know p then p" it's rational to believe "I know p" for the latter is equivalent to the material implication corresponding to the conditional, namely "I know p or p".) 18 See Jenkins (2006), Ball (2013), Greco (2014), Stalnaker (2015), Dutant (2016) and Goodman and Salow (2018) for accounts along those lines. Views of that kind are sometimes put forward to vindicate the KK principle (Greco, Stalnaker, Goodman and Salow).…”

Section: A Simple Fixmentioning

confidence: 99%

Justification, knowledge, and normality

Littlejohn

Dutant

2019

Philos Stud

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“…Obviously, rational belief is not enough for knowledge, but a rational belief 33 The standard complaint about infallibilism is that it leads to scepticism. See Dutant (2016) for helpful discussion. 34 The primary purpose of the example is to show that the infallibilist response to Philosopher or Accountant isn't available to reasons perspectivists.…”

Section: A Response: Infallibilist Reasons Perspectivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism

Littlejohn

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

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This paper looks at whether it is possible to unify the requirements of rationality with the demands of normative reasons. It might seem impossible to do because one depends upon the agent's perspective and the other upon features of the situation. Enter Reasons Perspectivism. Reasons perspectivists think they can show that rationality does consist in responding correctly to reasons by placing epistemic constraints on these reasons. They think that if normative reasons are subject to the right epistemic constraints, rational requirements will correspond to the demands generated by normative reasons. While this proposal is prima facie plausible, it cannot ultimately unify reasons and rationality. There is no epistemic constraint that can do what reasons perspectivists would need it to do. Some constraints are too strict. The rest are too slack. This points to a general problem with the reasons-first program. Once we recognize that the agent's epistemic position helps determine what she should do, we have to reject the idea that the features of the agent's situation can help determine what we should do. Either rationality crowds out reasons and their demands or the reasons will make unreasonable demands. 0. Three Claims Consider three prima facie plausible claims about normative reasons and rationality. 1 Standard Factualism says that normative reasons are (typically) the facts about features of the situation that we have in mind when we're thinking about whether to f. 2 Normative reasons determine whether an agent ought to f by doing things like counting in favour or against. 3 They can have weights we compare in practical deliberation. 4 They would be good candidates for being premises of good reasoning or being what these premises concern. 5 They include such facts as the fact that a promise was made (a reason to meet a friend), the fact that the dog didn't bark (a reason to believe the thief was on staff), or the fact that someone betrayed your trust (a reason to be upset

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How to be an Infallibilist*

Cited by 36 publications

References 53 publications

Infallibilism and Easy Counter-Examples

Infallibilism and Easy Counter-Examples

Justification, knowledge, and normality

Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism

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