2015
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12162
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How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions

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Cited by 7 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“… I've argued elsewhere that we often use ascriptions of knowledge as heuristic proxies for other and more complex epistemic assessments (Gerken 2015b, 2017a–b). …”
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confidence: 99%
“… I've argued elsewhere that we often use ascriptions of knowledge as heuristic proxies for other and more complex epistemic assessments (Gerken 2015b, 2017a–b). …”
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confidence: 99%
“…A handful of philosophers have attempted to shed light on the semantics of ‘knows that’ by reflecting on the function of knowledge ascriptions (Greco , Henderson , Hannon , McKenna ). Others have raised doubts about the viability of this strategy (Rysiew , Gerken ). In this paper, I will remain neutral on that issue.…”
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confidence: 99%
“…For another sort of argument that appeals to the social roles of knowledge seeGreco (2008),Henderson (2009) andHannon (2013). For criticism of this argument seeGerken (2015) andRysiew (2012).…”
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confidence: 99%