How to do things with standards

Waldron, Jeremy; Baxi, Upendra; McCrudden, Christopher; Paliwala, Abdul

doi:10.1017/cbo9781316337325.017

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…They try to define a legitimate mode of roughly equivalent expression, a sort of safe haven for the moderate expression of the gist of the view whose hateful or hate-inciting expression is prohibited. 31 Waldron's bending over backward argument rests on what can be called 'the manner-matter distinction' (or the form-substance distinction), and one's assessment of this argument primarily depends on whether one accepts this distinction. Waldron's idea seems to be twofold.…”

Section: Waldron On Democratic Legitimacy and Permissible Viewpoint-based Restrictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Democratic legitimacy, political speech and viewpoint neutrality

Ekeli

2020

Philosophy & Social Criticism

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The purpose of this article is to consider the question of whether democratic legitimacy requires viewpoint neutrality with regard to political speech – including extremist political speech, such as hate speech. The starting point of my discussion is Jeremy Waldron’s negative answer to this question. He argues that it is permissible for liberal democracies to ban certain extremist viewpoints – such as vituperative hate speech – because such viewpoint-based restrictions protect the dignity of persons and a social and moral environment of mutual respect. According to Waldron, well-drafted narrow hate speech bans are not democratically illegitimate, and they do not undermine systemic democratic legitimacy – that is, the legitimacy of a democratic political system. In contrast to Waldron, I will argue that democratic legitimacy requires viewpoint neutrality to respect persons as thinking agents. I will defend a civil libertarian doctrine of viewpoint neutrality, and this doctrine requires that citizens in liberal democracies ought to have a legal free speech right to do moral wrong – that is, a legal right to express and defend any political viewpoint or idea, even if it is morally wrong to express, or expose others to, such views. It will be argued that any viewpoint-based restriction on public discourse (including narrow hate speech bans) is democratically illegitimate, and that such restrictions undermine systemic democratic legitimacy.

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Section: Waldron On Democratic Legitimacy and Permissible Viewpoint-based Restrictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…. .views are expressed' 32 ). Second, narrow hate speech laws do not prevent hate speakers from communicating the substance of their viewpoints or thoughts, but only prevent hate speakers from communicating their viewpoints or ideas in a vituperative or extreme manner.…”

Section: Waldron On Democratic Legitimacy and Permissible Viewpoint-based Restrictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%