How to embed an epistemic modal: Attitude problems and other defects of character

Abstract

This paper develops a contextualist account of certain recalcitrant embedding phenomena with epistemic modals. I focus on three prominent objections to contextualism from embedding: first, that contextualism mischaracterizes subjects' states of mind; second, that contextualism fails to predict how epistemic modals are obligatorily linked to the subject in attitude ascriptions; and third, that contextualism fails to explain the persisting anomalousness of so-called ''epistemic contradictions'' (Yalcin 2007) in suppositional contexts. Contextualists have inadequately appreciated the force of these objections. Drawing on a more general framework for implementing a contextualist theory (Silk 2016a), I argue that we can derive the distinctive embedding behavior of epistemic modals from a particular contextualist interpretation of a standard semantics for modals, general mechanisms of local interpretation, and typical features of discourse contexts. Examining embedding phenomena with epistemic modals raises difficult broader issues about conventionalization and pragmatic reasoning, the varieties of context-sensitive language, and the roles of context in interpretation. The paper concludes by briefly examining how the proposed contextualist account compares with certain relativist/expressivist accounts. Keywords Epistemic modals Á Contextualism Á Relativism Á Attitude ascriptions Á Conditionals Á Epistemic contradictions Portions of this paper appear in Silk (2016a: chs. 3-4), which develops certain of the key ideas and general contextualist framework more extensively.

Semantic expressivism for epistemic modals

“…One can never be too careful. (Silk 2017(Silk , p. 1789 Should this be granted as data? To our ears, (36) sounds odd.…”

Expectation Biases and Context Management with Negative Polar Questions

“…To illustrate how the account may be developed with minimal revisionary apparatus, I assume a classical contextualist semantics which implements the context-sensitivity of the relevant epistemic expressions in same kind of way as the context-sensitivity of individual pronouns, quantifiers, etc. ; I assume in particular the sort of contextualist approach developed in Silk [65,66]. Read-ers favoring relativist/expressivist semantics may adapt the discussion accordingly (see n. 9).…”

“…Endorsing uses of epistemic modals (hereafter endorsing-epistemic uses) call for an epistemic premise frame variable that represents information endorsed in the context (Silk [65,66]). For expository purposes I use 'P e ' for the variable invoked in endorsing-epistemic uses, with the subscript 'e' to indicate the intended index/assignment and interpretation of the variable.…”

“…Kratzer's [28,29] semantics uses two premise sets: a "modal base" F (w) that describes some set of background facts in w, and an "ordering source" G(w) that represents the content of some ideal in w. This complication won't be relevant here; I treat modals as evaluated with respect to a single finite, consistent premise set. I sometimes suppress world-indexing on premise sets; talk about p "following from (/being compatible with) P " is short for saying that p follows from (/is compatible with) P (w), for any relevant world w. I address further details of the formal semantics shortly (see also Silk [65,66]). I use bold for variables, and italics for their values in context.…”

“…This distinction has been noted in many areas under various labels; see alsoHare [24], von Wright[91], Narrog[42], Verstraete[89], Silk[65,66]. Expressions may differ in tendencies for endorsing/nonendorsing use; e.g., for deontic readings of modal verbs, 'must' is typically used endorsingly, whereas 'have to' is more flexible (e.g.…”