How to expect a surprising exam

Kim, Brian; Vasudevan, Anubav

doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1096-y

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…99See Kripke (2011, ch.2). Kim and Vasudevan (2017) have nicely accounted for this intuition with respect to SURPRISE. As will be clear below, our view accounts for this intuition, as it shows that every iteration of the student's argument requires additional knowledge.…”

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confidence: 89%

“…With every day that passes, the students discard the relevant disjunct and hence by the last day, they must lose their knowledge. Since TAF does not imply a disjunction of blindspots, nor does it leave room for contingent information that supports discarding particular elements, Sorensen's solution is unavailable.9 See Kripke (2011, ch.2) Kim and Vasudevan (2017). have nicely accounted for this intuition with respect to SURPRISE.…”

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If you don't know that you know, you could be surprised

Pitcovski

Spectre

2020

Nous

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Before the semester begins, a teacher tells his students: "There will be exactly one exam this semester. It will not take place on a day that is an immediate-successor of a day that you are currently in a position to know is not the exam-day". Both the students and the teacher know-it is common knowledge-that no exam can be given on the first day of the semester. Since the teacher is truthful and reliable, it seems that the students can know that what he says is true. However, in that case, assuming the students can know that they know whatever it is they know (KK) and assuming their knowledge is closed under entailment (closure), the students can reason from what they know to the conclusion that no exam will take place during the semester. This conclusion contradicts what they supposedly know: that there will be an exam. This puzzle, we argue, gives rise to a new consideration for the rejection of KK. We discuss unique features of the argument, especially in comparison to Timothy Williamson's rejection of KK in light of other versions of the surprise exam paradox.

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If you don't know that you know, you could be surprised

Pitcovski

Spectre

2020

Nous

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“…See Kim and Vasudevan (forthcoming) for a contextualist account of expectation and surprise that is compatible with a pragmatism regarding of both concepts.…”

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confidence: 95%

Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology

Kim

2017

Philosophy Compass

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Epistemology orthodoxy is a purist one in the sense that it separates out the epistemic from the practical. What counts as evidence is independent of what we care about. Which beliefs count as justified and which count as knowledge are independent of our practical concerns. In recent years, many epistemologists have abandoned such purist views and embraced varying degrees of pragmatic encroachment on the epistemic. I survey a variety of these views and explore the main arguments that proponents of pragmatic encroachment have offered in addition to the main criticisms of the pragmatic approach. | INTRODUCTIONAccording to philosophical lore, epistemological orthodoxy is a purist epistemology in which epistemic concepts are characterized to be pure and free from practical concerns. On this purist view, what counts as knowledge, for example, is independent of what we care about, and what is good or bad for us is independent of what we have evidence to believe or accept. So one is a purist to the extent that one believes that the epistemic realm is independent of the practical realm and that our epistemic concepts are independent from our practical ones. 1In recent years, a number of challenges have been posed against purism from proponents of pragmatic encroachment, who adhere to the slogan that the practical encroaches on the epistemic. 2 Let us call any view that adheres to this slogan pragmatic. Since proponents of pragmatic encroachment represent a variety of philosophical approaches and views, the slogan is purposely ambiguous, open to a variety of interpretations and applications. I shall, however, begin our discussion by focusing on one specific interpretation. Once we have done so, we can then raise questions about how we have interpreted the slogan and explore alternatives that widen and/or change the scope of the slogan's application. I will do so by offering a taxonomy of pragmatic views in section 4.We start by specifying what we mean by "the practical" by appealing to a demarcation of practical from nonpractical factors that corresponds with the demarcation between non-truth-relevant and truth-relevant factors.Relative to some proposition p, a factor is truth-relevant just in case it affects the likelihood that p is true or false.So anything that raises or lowers the objective or subjective probability that p counts as truth-relevant. 3 For example, relative to the proposition that it will rain today, any proposition q (e.g., that there are clouds in the sky) such that the conditional probability that it will rain today given q is not equal to the unconditional probability that it will rain today will count as truth-relevant. On this initial interpretation, practical factors are just nontruthrelevant factors. 4Next, since knowledge is often taken as the central object of theoretical concern for epistemology, the most widely discussed question about pragmatic encroachment is the question of whether or not practical factors are

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“…Other examples that make a similar argument for resolution of the two-day paradox areKripke (2011),Kim and Vadusevan (2017) and the Inevitable Event in Holliday (2015).…”

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confidence: 92%

Beyond belief

Mourmans¹

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How to expect a surprising exam

Cited by 7 publications

References 21 publications

If you don't know that you know, you could be surprised

If you don't know that you know, you could be surprised

Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology

Beyond belief

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