How to identify wholes with their parts

Payton, Jonathan D.

doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02191-z

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…This argument also motivates his claims that what exists is relative to a carving, and that we can't carve a portion of reality into one thing and many at once, since these claims allow us to avoid seemingly inconsistent number-ascriptions. 24 But I've argued elsewhere (Payton, 2019;n.d. ) for a semantics of number ascriptions which renders 'a is one thing' and 'a is many things' consistent, and which does so without appeal to discrete domains of quantification or the notion of 'general identity'.…”

Section: Cotnoirmentioning

confidence: 98%

Composition as identity, now with all the pluralities you could want

Payton

2021

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According to 'composition as identity' (CAI), a composite object is identical to all its parts taken together. Thus, a plurality of composite objects is identical to the plurality of those objects' parts. This has the consequence that, e.g., the bricks which compose a brick wall are identical to the atoms which compose those bricks, and hence that the plurality of bricks must include each of those atoms. This consequence of CAI is in direct conflict with the standard analysis of plural definite descriptions (and hence with the standard plural comprehension schema which uses it). According to that analysis, the denotation of 'the bricks' can include only bricks. It seems, then, that if CAI is true, 'the bricks' doesn't denote anything; more generally, if CAI is true, there are fewer pluralities than we ordinarily think. I respond to this argument by developing an alternative analysis of plural descriptions (and an alternative comprehension schema) which allows the denotation of 'the bricks' to include non-bricks. Thus, we can accept CAI, while still believing in all the pluralities we could want. As a bonus, my approach to plural descriptions and plural comprehension blocks recent arguments to the effect that CAI entails compositional nihilism.

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Section: Cotnoirmentioning

confidence: 98%

Composition as identity, now with all the pluralities you could want

Payton

2021

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“…For recent defences, seeBohn 2014, Payton 2021, forthcoming-b, forthcoming-c and Wallace 2011a, 2011b 2 See e.g.Bohn 2014: 148-52 and Wallace 2011b: 818-21. The claim is strongly associated with Lewis (1991: 81-85), although it's not clear whether Lewis accepts CAI or the weaker thesis that parts and wholes stand in a relation analogous to identity.…”

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confidence: 99%

Composition and plethological innocence

Payton

2021

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According to Composition as Identity (CAI), a whole is distinct from each of its parts individually, but identical to all of them taken together. It is sometimes claimed that, if you accept CAI, then your belief in a whole is ‘ontologically innocent’ with respect to your belief in its parts. This claim is false. But the defender of CAI can claim a different advantage for her view. Following Agustín Rayo, I distinguish ontology (which concerns what there is) from plethology (which concerns what there are). I then show that CAI allows us to introduce an interesting notion of ‘plethological innocence’ which would otherwise collapse into the notion of ‘ontological innocence’, and that CAI renders belief in composite objects plethologically (but not ontologically) innocent.

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“…See, for instance,Payton (2019) andLoss (2019) on two recent ways of accounting for the idea that a whole is both one and many without relativizing 'being one' and 'being many' to counts or ways of conceptualizing.8 On the idea that CAI entails that mereology is innocent see, among others,Cotnoir (2014, p. 7),Bennett (2015, p. 256),Varzi (2014, p. 49), andHawley (2014, p. 72).…”

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confidence: 99%

Composition, identity and plural ontology

Loss¹

2020

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According to 'Strong Composition as Identity' (SCAI), if an entity is composed of a plurality of entities, it is identical to them. As it has been argued in the literature, SCAI appears to give rise to some serious problems which seem to suggest that SCAItheorists should take their plural quantifier to be governed by some 'weak' plural comprehension principle and, thus, 'exclude' some kinds of pluralities from their plural ontology. The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to what may appear at first sight, the assumption of a weak plural comprehension principle is perfectly compatible with plural logic and the common uses of plural quantification. As I aim to show, SCAI-theorists can simply claim that their theory must be understood as formulated by means of the most 'joint-carving' plural quantifier, thus leaving open the possibility of other, less joint-carving, 'unrestricted' plural quantifiers. In the final part of the paper I will also suggest that SCAI-theorists should not only allow for singular quantification over pluralities of entities, but also for plural quantification over 'super-pluralities' of entities.

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How to identify wholes with their parts

Cited by 6 publications

References 31 publications

Composition as identity, now with all the pluralities you could want

Composition as identity, now with all the pluralities you could want

Composition and plethological innocence

Composition, identity and plural ontology

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