How to Learn about Aesthetics and Morality through Acquaintance and Deference

Lord, Errol

doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823841.003.0004

Cited by 34 publications

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“…Whiting and Lord disagree about whether it'd be reasonable to believe that the song is beautiful. But both use such comparisons to pump the intuition that Kiara's testimony gives you no reason at all to approve of the song (Whiting 2015: 96-7, 106-7;Lord 2016Lord , 2018; they argue from such intuitions that we should accept N R.…”

Section: The Right Comparison Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Approving on the Basis of Moral and Aesthetic Testimony

Wodak¹

2021

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16

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While there is a vibrant debate over whether believing or acting on the basis of moral and aesthetic testimony is ‘defective’, most grant that approving on the basis of normative testimony is verboten. The main goal of this chapter is to defend such affective responses to normative testimony and it does this by arguing that philosophers have relied on the wrong comparison cases: we need to compare minimal contrastive pairs, and better and worse cases of approving on the basis of normative testimony; and once we do so, it is clear that such testimony gives us some reason to approve, and sometimes strong reasons to approve. A subsidiary goal is to show that if approving on the basis of normative testimony is not defective, this should make us optimistic that normative testimony gives us (strong) reasons to believe and act, while making the ‘fishiness’ of these responses harder to explain.

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Section: The Right Comparison Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Approving on the Basis of Moral and Aesthetic Testimony

Wodak¹

2021

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16

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“…14 Fletcher (2016) and Lord (2018) use "direct" to mean what I mean by "complete." 15 For example, McGrath (2011, 113n5) says, "Notice that here, holding a view 'solely because another person holds that view' does not imply or suggest that one lacks independent reason to think that the person is reliable.…”

Section: The Phenomenonmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But we do not usually rely on others for our moral beliefs-even if they are experts and we are not. For example, consider the following case: of actions, i.e., the properties that bear on the moral status of an action (e.g., Enoch [2014], Fletcher [2016], and Lord [2018]), or it cannot (or does not) yield moral understanding-why (Nickel [2001], Hopkins [2007], Hills [2009 and2010], McGrath [2011], and Callahan [2018]). 2 The moral claim is that because of the epistemic deficiency, moral deference is also in tension with gaining certain moral achievements, e.g., performing actions with moral worth or fittingly having the full range of affective and conative reactions to morally valenced situations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The New Puzzle of Moral Deference

Lewis

2020

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Philosophers think that there is something fishy about moral deference. The most common explanation of this fishiness is that moral deference doesn’t yield the epistemic states necessary for certain moral achievements (e.g., acting with moral worth or being virtuous). First, I argue that this explanation overgeneralizes. It entails that using many intuitively kosher belief-formation methods (e.g., abduction, reductio ad absurdum, and intuition) should be off-putting. Second, I argue that moral deference is sometimes superior to these other methods because it puts one in a better position to gain the relevant moral achievements.

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“…Some argue that the fact that the act is right is itself a reason that makes it right for one to act while others deny this. Proponents of the first view include Lord ( 2018 ) and Johnson-King ( 2019 ). Philosophers who deny this view include: Arpaly ( 2003 ) and Arpaly and Schroeder ( 2014 ).…”

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confidence: 99%

The knowledge norm of assertion: keep it simple

Lewis

2021

Synthese

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The simple knowledge norm of assertion (SKNA) holds that one may (epistemically permissibly) assert that p only if one knows that p. Turri (Aust J Philos 89(1):37–45, 2011) and Williamson (Knowledge and its limits, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) both argue that more is required for epistemically permissible assertion. In particular, they both think that the asserter must assert on the basis of her knowledge. Turri calls this the express knowledge norm of assertion (EKNA). I defend SKNA and argue against EKNA. First, I argue that EKNA faces counterexamples. Second, I argue that EKNA assumes an implausible view of permissibility on which an assertion is epistemically permissible only if it is made for a right reason, i.e., a reason that contributes to making it the case that it is epistemically permissible to make that assertion. However, the analogous view in other normative domains is both controversial and implausible. This is because it doesn’t make it possible for one to act or react rightly for the wrong reason. I suggest that proponents of EKNA have conflated requirements for φ-ing rightly (or permissibly) with requirements for φ-ing well. Finally, I argue that proponents of SKNA can explain the intuitive defectiveness of asserting on the basis of an epistemically bad reason (e.g., a random guess), even when the asserters know the content of their assertion, by arguing that the asserters are epistemically blameworthy.

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How to Learn about Aesthetics and Morality through Acquaintance and Deference

Cited by 34 publications

References 0 publications

Approving on the Basis of Moral and Aesthetic Testimony

Approving on the Basis of Moral and Aesthetic Testimony

The New Puzzle of Moral Deference

The knowledge norm of assertion: keep it simple

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