How to Reason Sensibly Yet Naturally from Inconsistencies

Meheus, Joke

doi:10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_9

Cited by 12 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…As a matter of fact, even the ones who defend that contradictions could be and actually are tolerated in the sciences (cf. Lakatos 1970;Laudan 1977;Smith 1988;Brown 1990;Meheus 2002;Priest 2002) would not necessarily agree on contradictions being candidates for the partial truth.…”

Section: (Minimalist) Selective-realist Anti-dialetheistmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Are you a selective-realist dialetheist without knowing it?

Martínez-Ordaz

2019

Rev. colomb. filos. cienc.

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Recently there has been a tendency on the part of some scientific realists to weaken their philosophical theses with respect to the success of science. Some of them have suggested that a satisfactorily realist standpoint should be a highly modest approach to scientific success , leaving many with the impression that scientific realism nowadays is nothing that we once thought it was. In light of that, the main concern of this paper is methodological, here I want to answer the question how far can we push the boundaries of our realist commitments and still be in control of our philosophical claims. In particular, I deal with the issue of how a certain type of weak version of selective realism will necessarily allow for true contradictions, dialetheias –even if that is not desirable. Here I argue that if one presents a very weak characterization of selective realism, one that is in line with contemporary projects, this type of realism will not forbid the possibility of things such as dialetheias. I also claim that, if that is the case, we face the following dilemma: or our general characterization of selective realism is mistaken or selective realists cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of why and how to forbid dialetheias in science

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Section: (Minimalist) Selective-realist Anti-dialetheistmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…The main assertion of those defending this standpoint is that, contrary to what the traditional view might suggest, inconsistent theories do not always have to be rejected (cf. Lakatos 1970;Laudan 1977;Smith 1988;Meheus 2002;Priest 2002).…”

Section: Minimalist Selective Realism and True Contradictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are you a selective-realist dialetheist without knowing it?

Martínez-Ordaz

2019

Rev. colomb. filos. cienc.

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“…Beall (2013) phrases the commitment in terms of a constraint according to which one is not to reject consequences: 'If XrA, then it's irrational to accept X and reject A' (Beall 2013, 4). Meheus (2002) offers a finer-grained analysis distinguishing between sensible and acceptable consequences. The latter are those statements that also hold according to the intended consistent replacement of a theory, while the former are the ones provided by the consequence relation of a logic.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Concerning Peter Vickers's Recent Treatment of ‘Paraconsistencitis’

Šešelja¹,

Straßer²

2014

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

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“…However, as I argue in [10], the argument is only valid for cases in which the inconsistencies can be resolved in a non-comparative way.…”

Section: The Logic Anmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As I argued elsewhere (see [7] and [10]), problem solving in the sciences frequently involves inconsistencies. In nineteenth century thermodynamics, for instance, Rudolf Clausius tried to derive the answer to the question whether Carnot's theorem is valid from two incompatible approaches to thermodynamic phenomena.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the acceptance of problem solutions derived from inconsistent constraints

Meheus

2004

LLP

Self Cite

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Abstract. In this paper, I discuss the main difficulties one encounters when solving problems with inconsistent constraints. I argue that in order to meet these difficulties we need an inconsistency-adaptive logic that enables one to derive as many (interesting) consequences as possible, but that at the same time allows one to determine which consequences can be accepted. I show that the inconsistency-adaptive logic ANA satisfies these requirements.

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How to Reason Sensibly Yet Naturally from Inconsistencies

Cited by 12 publications

References 9 publications

Are you a selective-realist dialetheist without knowing it?

Are you a selective-realist dialetheist without knowing it?

Concerning Peter Vickers's Recent Treatment of ‘Paraconsistencitis’

On the acceptance of problem solutions derived from inconsistent constraints

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