How to resolve doxastic disagreement

Brössel, Peter; Eder, Anna-Maria A.

doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0431-4

Cited by 14 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…It is compatible with the Equal Weight View (Elga 2007), the Total Evidence View (Kelly 2010), "synergistic" views (Easwaran et al 2016), and pretty much any formal proposal for pooling credences (cf. Brössel and Eder 2014;Pettigrew 2017). I believe only Right Reasons views (Titelbaum 2015) would deny it.…”

Section: Disagreementmentioning

confidence: 94%

Higher-Order Uncertainty

Dorst¹

2019

Higher-Order Evidence

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You have higher-order uncertainty iff you are uncertain of what opinions you should have. This chapter defends three claims about it. First, the higher-order evidence debate can be helpfully reframed in terms of higher-order uncertainty. The central question becomes how your first- and higher-order opinions should relate—a precise question that can be embedded within a general, tractable framework. Second, this question is nontrivial. Rational higher-order uncertainty is pervasive, and lies at the foundations of the epistemology of disagreement. Third, the answer is not obvious. The Enkratic Intuition—that your first-order opinions must “line up” with your higher-order opinions—is incorrect; epistemic akrasia can be rational. If all this is right, then it leaves us without answers—but with a clear picture of the question, and a fruitful strategy for pursuing it.

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Section: Disagreementmentioning

confidence: 94%

Higher-Order Uncertainty

Dorst¹

2019

Higher-Order Evidence

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“…We proposed such a framework, which we here refer to as Dyadic Bayesianism. 7 This framework is also apt for present purposes.…”

Section: Dyadic Bayesianism Higher-order Evidence and Two Assumptiomentioning

confidence: 99%

Evidence of Evidence as Higher-Order Evidence

Eder¹,

Broessel²

2019

Higher-Order Evidence

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In everyday life and in science we acquire evidence of evidence and based on this new evidence we often change our epistemic states. An assumption underlying such practice is that the following EEE Slogan is correct: ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. We suggest that evidence of evidence is best understood as higher-order evidence about the epistemic state of agents. In order to model evidence of evidence the chapter introduces a new powerful framework for modelling epistemic states, Dyadic Bayesianism. Based on this framework, it then discusses characterizations of evidence of evidence and argues for one of them. Finally, the chapter shows that whether the EEE Slogan holds, depends on the specific kind of evidence of evidence.

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“…For a detailed exposition of how our inductive probabilities should be interpreted see Brössel (2012). Brössel and Eder (2014) Note that the following Requirement 2 seems to admit of the possibility that some hypotheses can explain the evidence while actually lowering its probability. (The requirement specifies how a measure of explanatory power behaves in case Pr(E H) < Pr(E), even though we do not know whether the assumption that the hypothesis actually explains the evidence is compatible with the case of Pr(E H) < Pr(E).…”

Section: Explanatory Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

On the role of explanatory and systematic power in scientific reasoning

Brössel

2015

Synthese

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The paper investigates measures of explanatory power and how to define the inference schema "Inference to the Best Explanation" (IBE). It argues that these measures can also be used to quantify the systematic power of a hypothesis and defines the inference schema "Inference to the Best Systematization" (IBS). It demonstrates that systematic power is a fruitful criterion for theory choice and that IBS is truth-conducive. It also shows that even radical Bayesians must admit that systematic power is an integral component of Bayesian reasoning. Finally, the paper puts the achieved results in perspective with van Fraassen's famous criticism of IBE.

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How to resolve doxastic disagreement

Cited by 14 publications

References 20 publications

Higher-Order Uncertainty

Higher-Order Uncertainty

Evidence of Evidence as Higher-Order Evidence

On the role of explanatory and systematic power in scientific reasoning

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