2009
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1461222
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How to Stop a Herd of Running Bears? Market Response to Policy Initiatives During the Global Financial Crisis

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Cited by 19 publications
(15 citation statements)
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References 39 publications
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“…Secondly, where any contagion is detected it tends to originate from our liquidity variables, the Libor-OIS spread and/or the change in the 30-day ABCP rate. Previously, liquidity problems in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers have been attributed to transmitting the crisis internationally (Aït-Sahalia, Andritzky, Jobst, Nowak, & Tamirisa, 2009;Brunnermeier, 2008; among others) but here we show that shocks to liquidity variables were also instrumental in exacerbating the crisis across the U.S. financial system. Thirdly, there is limited evidence that deteriorating conditions in the subprime mortgage-backed market helped to predict the transition between regimes.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 56%
“…Secondly, where any contagion is detected it tends to originate from our liquidity variables, the Libor-OIS spread and/or the change in the 30-day ABCP rate. Previously, liquidity problems in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers have been attributed to transmitting the crisis internationally (Aït-Sahalia, Andritzky, Jobst, Nowak, & Tamirisa, 2009;Brunnermeier, 2008; among others) but here we show that shocks to liquidity variables were also instrumental in exacerbating the crisis across the U.S. financial system. Thirdly, there is limited evidence that deteriorating conditions in the subprime mortgage-backed market helped to predict the transition between regimes.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 56%
“…In this regard, Aït-Sahalia et al (2009) find that, for a number of advanced economies and using an event study methodology, government interventions had a significant impact on the easing stress in the interbanking market but that this effect was smaller the more prolonged the crisis became.…”
Section: B Results After Massive Government Programs In 2009 To Addrmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The financial market has also proven itself to be able to absorb the greatest part of the issued money without preventing contagion at all, as observable in the problems following the sub-prime crisis (Mizen 2008;Ait-Sahalia et al 2009). Models have estimated that financial shocks on leveraged sectors and the redistribution between these sectors accounted for approximately two-thirds of the output collapse in the time after the subprime crisis (Iacoviello 2015).…”
Section: Credit Crunches and The Central Banksmentioning
confidence: 99%