How to Tell a Dualist?

Berent, Iris

doi:10.1111/cogs.13380

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 57 publications

(136 reference statements)

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“…Humans, for instance, can learn that thinking “happens” in the brain and ceases after death (e.g., through their science training), but at heart, remain “closet Dualists. This tension is only expected by the hypothesis that intuitive Dualism is a “soft”, violable bias, rather than an absolute inviolable rule (Berent, 2023b ). The mixed response of GPT 3.5 appears to reflect the same tension.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Past research has shown that humans do not consider all psychological traits as equally likely to manifest in the brain. In particular, people systematically view thoughts (e.g., having a notion of a person; hereafter: epistemic traits) as less likely to manifest in the brain than other psychological characteristics, such as sensations, motor plans and emotions—collectively, non-epistemic traits (Berent, 2023a , 2023b , 2023c ; Berent & Platt, 2021 ; Berent et al, 2021 , 2022 ).…”

Section: Probing the Learnability Of Dualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, intuitive Dualism not only coarsely segregates mind from body (in line with the religious doctrine). Rather, people (adults and children) show granular distinctions that render thoughts ( epistemic states ) more ethereal than emotions, sensations and actions (hereafter, “ non-epistemic ” states; Berent, 2021 , 2023b , 2023c ; Berent & Platt, 2021 ; Berent et al, 2021 , 2022 ; Bering & Bjorklund, 2004 ; Sandoboe & Berent, 2021 ). While the Western canon, no doubt, presents learners with much evidence for a coarse mind–body contrast, it is uncertain whether it can explain these granular distinctions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Davinci the Dualist: The Mind–Body Divide in Large Language Models and in Human Learners

Berent,

Sansiveri

2024

Open Mind

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A large literature suggests that people are intuitive Dualists—they consider the mind ethereal, distinct from the body. Furthermore, Dualism emerges, in part, via learning (e.g., Barlev & Shtulman, 2021). Human learners, however, are also endowed with innate systems of core knowledge, and recent results suggest that core knowledge begets Dualism (Berent, 2023a; Berent et al., 2022). The resulting question, then, is whether the acquisition of Dualism requires core knowledge, or whether Dualism is learnable from experience alone, via domain-general mechanism. Since human learners are equipped with both systems, the evidence from humans cannot decide this question. Accordingly, here, we probe for a mind–body divide in Davinci—a large language model (LLM) that is devoid of core knowledge. We show that Davinci still leans towards Dualism, and that this bias increases systematically with the learner’s inductive potential. Thus, davinci (which forms part of the GPT-3 suite) exhibits mild Dualist tendencies, whereas its descendent, text-davinci-003 (a GPT-3.5 model), shows a stronger bias. It selectively considers thoughts (epistemic states) as disembodied—as unlikely to show up in the body (in the brain). Unlike humans, GPT 3.5 categorically rejected the persistence of the psyche after death. Still, when probed about life, GPT 3.5 showed robust Dualist tendencies. These results demonstrate that the mind–body divide is partly learnable from experience. While results from LLMs cannot fully determine how humans acquire Dualism, they do place a higher burden of proof on nativist theories that trace Dualism to innate core cognition (Berent, 2023a; Berent et al., 2022).

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Probing the Learnability Of Dualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Davinci the Dualist: The Mind–Body Divide in Large Language Models and in Human Learners

Berent,

Sansiveri

2024

Open Mind

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Consciousness isn’t “hard”—it’s human psychology that makes it so!

Berent

2024

Neuroscience of Consciousness

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Consciousness arguably presents a “hard problem” for scholars. An influential position asserts that the “problem” is rooted in ontology—it arises because consciousness “is” distinct from the physical. “Problem intuitions” are routinely taken as evidence for this view. In so doing, it is assumed that (i) people do not consider consciousness as physical and (ii) their intuitions faithfully reflect what exists (or else, intuitions would not constitute evidence). New experimental results challenge both claims. First, in some scenarios, people demonstrably view consciousness as a physical affair that registers in the body (brain). Second, “problem intuitions” are linked to psychological biases, so they cannot be trusted to reflect what consciousness is. I conclude that the roots of the “hard problem” are partly psychological. Accordingly, its resolution requires careful characterization of the psychological mechanisms that engender “problem intuitions.”

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How to Tell a Dualist?

Cited by 2 publications

References 57 publications

Davinci the Dualist: The Mind–Body Divide in Large Language Models and in Human Learners

Davinci the Dualist: The Mind–Body Divide in Large Language Models and in Human Learners

Consciousness isn’t “hard”—it’s human psychology that makes it so!

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