How Uncertainty and Accountability can Derail Strategic ‘Save Life’ Decisions in Counter‐Terrorism Simulations: A Descriptive Model of Choice Deferral and Omission Bias

Abstract

The present study sought to describe police officers' decision processes in simulated counter-terrorism events. Based on previous phase models of decision making and existing police policy in dealing with critical incidents of this nature, a descriptive SAFE-T (Situation Assessment, Formulate a plan, Execute a plan and Team learning) model was applied to team decision processes. Proximity and Lag Sequential analyses tested the occurrence of the predicted decision phases set out in the model; these results indicated that the model did not fully capture the complexity of the process. Specifically, further qualitative analyses (and comparisons to a 'Gold Standard' set of subject matter expert decisions, conducted with the benefit of removing ambient and time pressure stressors) illustrated that a complex combination of ambient (uncertainty), cognitive (accountability pressures) and organizational (an existing blame culture and lack of policy) factors 'derailed' officers from making 'save life' decisions. Instead, albeit in a minority of cases, they either made errors of omission by failing to make any decision at all or inappropriate choice deferrals (by insisting another agency made the decision or that the decision could be made later). The potential benefits of making the SAFE-T decision process and how derailment can occur explicit in police critical incident training events are discussed.

Decision inertia: Deciding between least worst outcomes in emergency responses to disasters

“…When a decision is not constrained to deadlines, this means that decision-makers have the opportunity to avoid or redundantly deliberate on their choice. When decisions are perceived to be difficult, then individuals will try to avoid committing to a course of action (van den Heuvel et al, 2012) in order to avoid anticipated negative consequences such as negative emotions (Anderson, 2003), and when operating within organizational settings, the potential for criticism is due to accountability (Waring, Alison, Cunningham, & Whitfield, 2013). When someone expects to receive feedback on their actions in teambased settings, they will tend to avoid choice (Zeelenberg & van Dijk, 1997) due to the potential for anticipated loss (Crotty & Thompson, 2009), the anticipation of blame (Eyre et al, 2008), or the perceived inability to personally justify their choice (Brooks, 2011).…”

“…In other words, they appeared to rely on a cognitive heuristic that suggests when the solution to a problem is unclear, the safest option is to do nothing. Rather than commit to a choice, they actively (and with considerable cognitive effort) try and delay the implementation of a choice (Eyre, Alison, Crego, & McLean, 2008;van den Heuvel, Alison, & Crego, 2012). This is distinct from decision avoidance (Anderson, 2003) where decision-makers refuse to evaluate choice through passive inaction (e.g., 'I choose not to decide for the time being').…”

Exploring C2 Capability and Effectiveness in Challenging Situations : Interorganizational Crisis Management, Military Operations and Cyber Defence

“…The thematic analysis was conducted after the papers had been reviewed according to other criteria, which possibly speeded up the process as the reviewers had an overview of the dataset. During the review process, existing frameworks for essential aspects of crisis management were identified (Comfort, 2007;Sundnes, 2014;van den Heuvel, Alison, & Crego, 2012). None of them were assessed as fully sufficient for categorizing the publications in the dataset.…”

Experiential Learning and Simulation-Based Training in Norwegian Police Education: Examining Body-Worn Video as a Tool to Encourage Reflection

“…Simulations may contribute to the development of professional intuition and decision making by providing structured experiences in an environment designed to encourage flexible internalization through the use of critical reflection. Several studies on police training provide examples of simulations that may enhance conflict-resolution and decision-making skills (Helsen & Starkes, 1999); improve police officers' interactions with the mentally ill (Krameddine et al, 2013) and handgun shooting performance under pressure (Oudejans, 2008); or be particularly effective to research complex and risky decision-making during critical incidents Eyre, Crego, & Alison, 2008;van den Heuvel, et al, 2012).…”