How vicious are cycles of intransitive choice?

Bar-Hillel, Maya; Margalit, Avishai

doi:10.1007/bf00132458

Cited by 65 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Another heuristic that can lead to intransitivities is the majority rule (e.g., Kenneth O. May 1954;Maya Bar-Hillel and Avishai Margalit 1988). With this rule, the decisionmaker simply counts the number of dimensions where an option has an advantage (disregarding the magnitude of the advantages) and selects the option with the greatest number of advantages.…”

Section: When Are Violations Of Consistencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Extending the Bounds of Rationality: Evidence and Theories of Preferential Choice

Rieskamp

Busemeyer²,

Mellers³

2006

Journal of Economic Literature

325

235

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Section: When Are Violations Of Consistencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Extending the Bounds of Rationality: Evidence and Theories of Preferential Choice

Rieskamp

Busemeyer²,

Mellers³

2006

Journal of Economic Literature

325

235

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Of course, it is questionable whether people maximize something at all [Selten, 1994], and whether they should do so from a normative point of view, as sometimes there might be good reasons for intransitive choices [Bar-Hillel and Margalit, 1988]. The latter means that substantive rationality can exist without formal rationality, tIowever, this paper will focus on the reverse case and assume formal rationality to be given, but not necessarily substantive rationality.…”

Section: Definition 1: the Choice-value Thesismentioning

confidence: 98%

The unimportance of the choice-value thesis in economics

Frank

2002

International Advances in Economic Research

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“…And, there are numerous cases in which relative preferences are not decomposable into component attitudes at all. For example, intransitive relative preferences, violating unidimensionality, have been demonstrated repeatedly (e.g., Bar-Hillel & Margalit, 1988;Birnbaum, 1992;Shafir, Osherson, & Smith, 1990;Tversky, 1969) as have sub-or superadditivity (Anderson, 1977). Also, Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, and Bazerman (1999) identified circumstances in which most participants preferred object A to object B when considered separately, while B was preferred to A in a relative comparison.…”

Section: Statementioning

confidence: 99%

Faulty assumptions: A comment on Blanton, Jaccard, Gonzales, and Christie (2006)

Nosek

Narayanan

2007

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

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Blanton, Jaccard, Gonzales, and Christie (BJGC, 2006) assert that the Implicit Association Test (IAT) imposes a model that portrays relative preferences as the additive difference between single attitudes. This assertion is misplaced because relative preferences do not necessarily reduce to component attitudes. BJGC also assume that the IAT conditions represent two indicators of the same construct. This assumption is incorrect, and is the cause of their poor-fitting models. The IAT, like other experimental paradigms, contrasts performance between interdependent conditions, and cannot be reduced to component parts. This is true whether calculating a simple difference between conditions, or using the IAT D score. D -an individual effect size that is monotonically related to Cohen's dcodifies the interdependency between IAT conditions. When their unjustified psychometric assumptions are replaced with plausible assumptions, the models fit their data very well, and basis for their poor-fitting models becomes clear.Blanton, Jaccard, Gonzales, and Christie (2006; hereafter "BJGC") criticize relative measurement and the use of difference scores for comparing experimental conditions. This article makes two points: (1) BJGC are too quick to dismiss the value of relative measurement and mistakenly suggest that relative attitude measures are necessarily reducible to component evaluations; and (2) BJGC misperceive the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, in press) conditions as analogous to two items of a scale and consequently impose invalid psychometric assumptions by decomposing the performance conditions as separate indicators of the construct. BJGC mistook their poor model fits as showing problems with the IAT rather than as indicating problems with their assumptions.

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How vicious are cycles of intransitive choice?

Cited by 65 publications

References 16 publications

Extending the Bounds of Rationality: Evidence and Theories of Preferential Choice

Extending the Bounds of Rationality: Evidence and Theories of Preferential Choice

The unimportance of the choice-value thesis in economics

Faulty assumptions: A comment on Blanton, Jaccard, Gonzales, and Christie (2006)

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