How voters think about the electoral relevance of the Supreme Court

Abstract

Despite sporadic claims that elections may serve as a referendum on the Supreme Court, prevailing theories of diffuse support imply that voters mostly ignore the Court. This paper tests that thesis. Using recent, nationally-representative survey data, Study 1 shows that, despite the Supreme Court being ranked as a middling issue of importance, high levels of diffuse support increase its perceived electoral relevance. Study 2 deploys a survey experiment, which illustrates that candidates who support (oppose) reform are viewed as stronger candidates among Democrats (Republicans), as well as more prototypically liberal (conservative). The sorting of demand for reform along partisan lines dovetails with a sorting of diffuse support, which presents an inherent irony for the prospects of reform: while low-legitimacy Democrats may support reform, lower levels of diffuse support are also linked to weaker perceptions of reform’s electoral relevance – providing mixed signals to candidates about the demand for reform.

Diffuse Support, Partisanship, and the Electoral Relevance of the Supreme Court

“…The Supreme Court of the United States has evolved over time, both in the scope of its powers (Chafetz 2017) and the extent to which the public regards it as an ideological institution (Davis and Hitt 2023;Gibson 2023). One constant over the years, however, has been allegations that political crisis surrounding and produced by the Court may have spillover electoral effects.…”

“…It may seem reasonable, then, to expect that voters would channel their dissatisfaction with this countermajoritarian trajectory through electoral mechanisms (Bouie 2022). On the other hand, it seems that the Supreme Court of the United States may freely engage in sharply ideological decision making without serious fear of reprisal from the other branches (Owens 2010), even as those very decisions damage its perceived legitimacy among partisans (Davis and Hitt 2023;Gibson 2023;Strother and Gadarian 2022).…”

“…Yet there is nothing in our data to suggest that liberal political entrepreneurs should pursue Court-curbing strategies. Not only is the Court's electoral relevance among Democrats low, but their expressions of diffuse support for the Court have soured (Davis and Hitt 2023). In theory, when legitimacy maps onto partisan sorting in this way, institutional cross-pressures ought to cease to act as a bulwark against calls to reform the judiciary (c.f.…”

“…The elimination of this liberty, coupled with several other controversial decisions during the same session, ranging from permitting public tax dollars to be spent on private, religious education to striking down regulations guiding concealed carry laws, sparked a renewed round of calls to fundamentally reshape the American judiciary (e.g., Representatives Ro Khanna (D-CA) and Don Beyer (D-VA) and the introduction of "The Supreme Court Term Limits and Regular Appointments Act"). Again, there were claims that the 2022 midterm elections might serve as a referendum on the Court by left-leaning voters (Cillizza 2022) who exhibited a new souring in the legitimacy of the Court that was distinct from the fallout from the Bush v. Gore (531 U.S. 98,2000) decision (Davis and Hitt 2023;Gibson 2023). 2 Curiously, the thread binding these different high-profile events together is the common muted institutional consequences that they have thus far produced.…”

“…Rather, it is the impression that rulings arise out of insincere or partisan considerations that is most damaging to the Court's reputation (Baird and Gangl 2006). In this way, the Court's significant rightward turn (Brown and Epstein 2023;Epstein and Posner 2022), alongside the damaging confirmations of the Trump era (Carrington and French 2021), has altered this stable perception of legitimacy (Gibson 2023), especially among Democratic partisans (Davis and Hitt 2023).…”