“…We complement studies of UI effects on search behavior and reemployment wages of unemployed workers (Feldstein and Poterba, 1984;Katz and Meyer, 1990;Krueger and Mueller, 2016;Schmieder et al, 2016;Le Barbanchon et al, 2017;Nekoei and Weber, 2017). Our focus on employed workers isolates the bargaining channel, whereas the unemployed are subject to multiple, perhaps offsetting, non-bargaining wage effects, such as skill depreciation (Dinerstein et al, 2019), job composition (McCall, 1970;Nekoei and Weber, 2017), or stigma (Kroft et al, 2013(Kroft et al, , 2016. Second, much of the literature focuses on benefit duration reforms, hence harder to price and map back into our model, and affecting only long spells.…”