Human Rights as Reputation Builder: Compliance with the Convention Against Torture

Abstract

A strong record of human rights protections is an important factor for a state to maintain a positive international reputation. In this article, we suggest that states will use compliance with human rights treaties as a mechanism by which to improve their reputations to help achieve their foreign policy goals. We hypothesize that international human rights compliance is a means to improve a state's reputation in three specific situations: when the state is facing regional pressures as the result of a desire to join a regional organization; when the state is facing regional pressures not to run afoul of a court within a regional organization; or when a state seeks foreign assistance from an entity with human rights requirements for the receipt of such assistance. We examine our theory by analyzing human rights reports regarding state compliance with specific treaty obligations outlined in the Convention Against Torture (CAT). While the evidence for our hypotheses is mixed, we do find some support for our assertion that state compliance is linked to reputational concerns. In particular, states comply with the CAT when they are part of a regional organization that has a human rights court, and when they are receiving conditional aid from the European Union.Reputation is an important component of a state's toolbox when it is considering its interactions with the international community. Given the importance of reputation in Hum Rights Rev (2011) 12:71-92

Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Preventive Self-Defense as a Cascading Norm

“…If successful, a norm cascade follows, in which the norm diffuses to other states through socialization, institutionalization, and demonstration. The rationale of the norm entrepreneur is adopted and its actions emulated because other states are concerned about their legitimacy, reputation, and esteem (Finnemore and Sikkink :898, 902–904; also Zartner and Ramos ). In the final stage, the norm is internalized by actors in the international system and essentially becomes taken for granted, integrated into practice without a second thought.…”

The (un)common law: Legal tradition and the diverging policies of the USA and Australia toward international human rights law

“…Some have argued that compliance is merely incidental to a state's broader power position or interests (Morgenthau, 1978;Waltz, 1979). Others, focusing on institutional factors at the state and interstate level, have considered explanations such as regime type (Mitchell, 1994;Simmons, 1998), market forces (Simmons, 2000), and reputation (Downs and Jones, 2002;Simmons, 2000;Zartner and Ramos 2011). Compliance, however, does not occur solely at the state and interstate level, but is largely achieved at the substate level when international legal norms are internalized into the fabric of society.…”

Defiance and Compliance: Australia and the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees

“…69 The OECD for example distributes a greater portion of foreign aid to states which have a higher level of compliance to human rights treaties than those which do not. See Zartner and Ramos (2011).…”