Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict

Abstract

This research project uses econometric methods and comparative, cross-national data to see whether violations of human rights increase the likelihood of the onset or escalation of violent protest, terrorism and/or civil war. The findings show that these types of violent internal conflict will occur and escalate if governments: (1) torture, politically imprison, kill, or “disappear” people, (2) do not allow women to participate fully in the political system, including allowing them to hold high level national political office, and (3) do not allow women to participate fully in the economic life of the nation by ensuring equal pay for equal work, by encouraging their entry to the highest paid occupations, and by protecting them from sexual harassment at their workplaces. These types of violations of human rights and the existence of large horizontal inequalities in societies independently produce an increased risk of the onset and escalation of many forms of violent internal conflict. The results also provide some evidence for the argument that there is a trade-off between liberty and security.

Conflict prevention in fragile contexts

“…Much of what works is specific to the context, which is not a surprising finding given that preventing violent conflict, especially in fragile contexts, is a messy, complex and political endeavour with few quick fixes (Cheng, Goodhand and Meehan, 2018 [86]). This reality runs counter to the short-termism of external intervention and the desire to scale interventions quickly.…”

“…Given the primacy of politics in peacebuilding and prevention, 2 it is important for donors to consider how political settlements are ordered and shape incentives for or against violent conflict. Political settlements involve either implicit or explicit bargains between elites to manage the distribution of rights and entitlements across a population (Cheng, Goodhand and Meehan, 2018 [86]). An exclusionary political settlement can create further incentives for violence (UN/World Bank, 2018 [12]).…”

“…Thinking and working politically in the context of such settlements involves influencing the behaviour of political actors to create arrangements that are inclusive and flexible enough to allow for the non-violent resolution of conflict (Cheng, Goodhand and Meehan, 2018 [86]). Such political settlement analysis moves beyond analysing the distribution of power within a particular system, which is the focus of political economy analysis, and towards interrogating the institutional rules of the game that form or preserve a tacit settlement in a fragile context (Kelsall, 2018[90]).…”

“…External action affects the social contract. For example, it can shape the legitimacy of the state to its citizens as well as attitudes of trust between groups in society and the underlying political settlements that mediate disputes (Cheng, Goodhand and Meehan, 2018 [86]). Specific to prevention, a range of external tools and activities can influence state-society relations and affect the preventive capacity of the state.…”

Self and political efficacy and the justifiability of political violence and the role of state terror: A cross‐national analysis

“…(2013), Bell and Murdie (2018), and Cingranelli et al. (2019) who show that less democracy and more human rights repression predict more episodes of political violence or unrest. Given that democracy and development are strongly correlated (Keefer and Knack 2000) and democracy and development also predict self‐efficacy (Corcoran, Pettinicchio, and Young 2011) and less democratic states repress more (Carey 2010), this thesis bears well at the country level; specifically, those countries with citizens predicted to have less efficacy and less space for open dissent have more political violence episodes.…”