Humanitized violence: Targeted killings and civilian deaths in the US war against the Islamic State

Abstract

Based on a qualitative content analysis of human rights reports, US military statements, and newspaper accounts, this article describes the ascendency of ‘humanitized violence,’ which characterizes airstrikes in the US war against the Islamic State (2014–2017). This hyper-rationalized violence utilizes precision weaponry, technical and administrative procedures to limit civilian deaths, and calculations to achieve goals in ‘proportionality.’ This method of violence is further accompanied by a discourse of precision, care, legality, and regret. The article further shows that leading nongovernmental critics of this violence largely accept its logic. Consequently, rather than offering opposition, humanitarian NGOs instead reinforce the humanitization of violence by calling on governments to be more precise and to exercise more care when striking enemy targets. Noting the high numbers of civilian deaths that can accompany humanitized violence, along with the US government’s continued capacity for total war, the author cautions that its rise does not necessarily portend a more peaceful future.

Callous Cruelty and Counterinsurgency: Civilian Victimization and Compensation in U.S.-Occupied Iraq

“…Army 2006:1–23) advises that “unjustified or excessive violence” will “undermine both long- and short-term COIN [counterinsurgency] efforts.” For this reason, the Counterinsurgency Manual, and notable U.S. counterinsurgency strategists like David Kilcullen (2010), insist that violence must only be used in limited and carefully targeted ways that minimize harm to the civilians that the counterinsurgency is trying to win over. U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is, in this sense, an effort to more fully rationalize violence, to make it more highly controlled, more precise, and ultimately less callous (Bonds 2018). Evidence from the Iraq War, in the form of U.S. Army documents released to the ACLU, clearly shows, however, that the U.S. military has a limited ability to more fully rationalize its violence and make it less callous while conducting a foreign occupation in the midst of a sectarian war.…”

“…If the U.S. government was able to more fully rationalize violence and better mitigate its aftermath, as advocated in its counterinsurgency doctrine, how might this look? First, the violence itself would be limited and highly precise—avoiding unwanted casualties to the fullest extent possible (Bonds 2018; Weizman 2011). In terms of an effective system to diminish harms to civilians affected by violence, a compensation program would likely look something like the approach promoted by the international nonprofit organization Center for Civilians in Conflict .…”

“…This article adds to these explanations by demonstrating that the U.S. government, aware of the limitations of military force as a form of social power, overestimated its ability to rationalize violence and diminish its impacts. Formal rationality creates the capacity to organize social life based on efficiency, calculability, standardization and, in the context of military bureaucracies, it has historically facilitated the continuous development of more and more devastating and precise modes of violence (Bonds 2018; Collins 1978). But Max Weber, the original scholar of rationality, underscored that formal rationality has its limits.…”

Strategic ignorance and the legitimation of remote warfare: The Hawija bombardments

“…Such statements point out how the constant application of new smart technologies and proportionality principles allow for a new form of ‘perfect warfare’, which saves lives of both Western military personnel and friendly civilians on the ground (Demmers et al, 2020). It presents past, present and future remote killings as ‘ethical’ (Schwarz, 2016), a ‘moral act of care’ (Chamayou, 2015: 108) and a form of ‘humanitized violence’ (Bonds, 2019).…”

Perfect war and its contestations

“…In tracing the above dynamics of interaction, we use a variety of sources. We draw on a small body of academic work (Bonds 2019;Chamayou 2015;Schwarz 2016;Schweiger 2019) as well as human rights reports, US military statements, and newspaper accounts to map the ascendency of a discourse of 'precision and care' accompanying the US-led anti-IS airstrikes between 2014 and 2019. In addition, information was gathered through interviews held with various actors within watchdog organizations, in particularly Airwars and Amnesty International; through participant observation at workshops, roundtables, public events organized and attended by both 'military' and 'watchdog' actors; and through a range of primary sources (press releases, evaluation reports, briefings, military magazines).…”