Humean agent-neutral reasons?

Evers, Daan

doi:10.1080/13869790802635614

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…We invite you to adopt this stipulation if you find that it indeed makes the case more compelling. 21 Evers (2009) also emphasizes that doing nothing can sometimes promote a desire. 22 Behrends and DiPaolo (2011: 5).…”

Section: Diagnosing the Failure Of Pp1 And Pp2mentioning

confidence: 93%

Probabilistic promotion revisited

Behrends

DiPaolo

2015

Philos Stud

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Promotion is the relation between an act and a desire that obtains when the act advances or serves the desire. Under what conditions does an act promote a desire? Probabilistic accounts of promotion, the most prominent accounts, analyze promotion in terms of an increase in the probability of the desire's satisfaction. In this paper, we clarify the promotion relation and explain why probabilistic accounts are attractive. Then we identify two questions probabilistic accounts must answer: the Baseline Question and the Interpretation Question. We discuss and reject the three answers to the Baseline Question found in the literature, and explain the challenge future attempts at answering this question will face. Proponents of probabilistic accounts have not adequately addressed the Interpretation Question. We survey three answers to this question, finding each unsatisfactory. We conclude that no satisfactory probabilistic account has yet been offered, and that there are significant hurdles to providing one in the future.

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Section: Diagnosing the Failure Of Pp1 And Pp2mentioning

confidence: 93%

Probabilistic promotion revisited

Behrends

DiPaolo

2015

Philos Stud

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“…Nevertheless, these accounts are now widely agreed to be mistaken. As Evers () argues, Schroeder's Promotion implies that one cannot promote p by doing nothing, since doing nothing can't make p more likely than it would have been if one had done nothing. But whatever doing nothing amounts to, one surely can promote a state of affairs by doing it: if God ensured that Jack would win the lottery if he did nothing at t , Jack could promote his winning the lottery by doing nothing at t .…”

Section: Probabilistic Accounts Of Promotionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simple Probabilistic Promotion

Lin

2016

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Many believe that normative reasons for action are necessarily connected with the promotion of certain states of affairs: on Humean views, for example, there is a reason for you to do something if and only if it would promote the object of one of your desires. But although promotion is widely invoked in discussions of reasons, its nature is a matter of controversy. I propose a simple account: to promote a state of affairs is to make it more likely to obtain than it previously was. I argue that this view has been unfairly neglected, that it avoids serious problems faced by many other views, and that it is a contender for the correct theory of promotion.

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“…See, for instance, the discussion betweenEvers (2009), Schroeder (2007a, 2010 and Enoch (2011) on Schroeder's solution to the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem. Although Schroeder makes some interesting gestures towards solving this problem, he does not provide a complete solution, and yet his position requires that there is one.…”

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confidence: 97%

Why I’m still a proportionalist

Rieder

2015

Philos Stud

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Mark Schroeder has, rather famously, defended a powerful Humean Theory of Reasons. In doing so, he abandons what many take to be the default Humean view of weighting reasons-namely, proportionalism. On Schroeder's view, the pressure that Humeans feel to adopt proportionalism is illusory, and proportionalism is unable to make sense of the fact that the weight of reasons is a normative matter. He thus offers his own 'Recursive View', which directly explains how it is that the weight of reasons is a normative matter. In this paper, I argue against Schroeder that a Humean ought to be a proportionalist. On my view, proportionalism is clearly an intuitive theory of weighting for a Humean, so we should resist it only if Schroeder can demonstrate either that there is a serious problem with the view, or that there is a better alternative. I then further argue that Schroeder fails to deliver on either condition. As a result, I conclude that there are good intuitive reasons for a Humean to be a proportionalist, and no good reason not to be.

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Humean agent-neutral reasons?

Cited by 11 publications

References 7 publications

Probabilistic promotion revisited

Probabilistic promotion revisited

Simple Probabilistic Promotion

Why I’m still a proportionalist

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