Humean laws, explanatory circularity, and the aim of scientific explanation

Dorst, Chris

doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1145-0

Cited by 17 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…From the Humean perspective, then, the fact that S m has nomological gaps in some exceedingly rare situations should not count as a major strike against it. 25…”

Section: Imprecisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Appeals to "measurement" in the fundamental laws are not a dealbreaker for the Humean in the way they are for an anti-Humean. Nevertheless, one might still think that there is an unresolved problem 25 Nomological gaps can plausibly be found even in such respectable theories as general relativity and Newtonian mechanics. Consider the wormhole cases popularized by Thorne (1994), or the dome case made famous by Norton (2003).…”

Section: Strangeness and Explanationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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There is no measurement problem for Humeans

Dorst

2021

Nous

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The measurement problem concerns an apparent conflict between the two fundamental principles of quantum mechanics, namely the Schrödinger equation and the measurement postulate. These principles describe inconsistent behavior for quantum systems in so-called "measurement contexts." Many theorists have thought that the measurement problem can only be resolved by proposing a mechanistic explanation of (genuine or apparent) wavefunction collapse that avoids explicit reference to "measurement." However, I argue here that the measurement problem dissolves if we accept Humeanism about laws of nature. On a Humean metaphysics, there is no conflict between the two principles, nor is there any inherent problem with the concept of "measurement" figuring into the account of collapse.

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“…From the Humean perspective, then, the fact that S m has nomological gaps in some exceedingly rare situations should not count as a major strike against it. 25…”

Section: Imprecisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Strangeness and Explanationmentioning

confidence: 99%

There is no measurement problem for Humeans

Dorst

2021

Nous

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“…While an analysis of every compatible account is beyond the scope of a single paper, I will now turn to a more recent proposal that differs in an important respect to those just covered. Dorst (2019) suggests that to respond to the circularity argument we should reemphasise Loewer's distinction between metaphysical and scientific explanations. On the proposed view, the virtues invoked by the Best System Account that guide the choice of laws are taken to be constitutive of lawhood.…”

Section: Explanation As Pattern Subsumptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lawful Humean explanations are not circular

Duguid

2021

Synthese

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A long-standing charge of circularity against regularity accounts of laws has recently seen a surge of renewed interest. The difficulty is that we appeal to laws to explain their worldly instances, but if these laws are descriptions of regularities in the instances then they are explained by those very instances. By the transitivity of explanation, we reach an absurd conclusion: instances of the laws explain themselves. While drawing a distinction between metaphysical and scientific explanations merely modifies the challenge rather than resolving it, I argue that it does point us towards an attractive solution. According to Humeanism, the most prominent form of the regularity view, laws capture information about important patterns in the phenomena. By invoking laws in scientific explanations, Humeans are showing how a given explanandum is subsumed into a more general pattern. Doing so both undermines a principle of transitivity that plays a crucial role in the circularity argument and draws out a central feature of the Humean approach to scientific explanation.

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“…So, the Humean needs some story about why chaining occurs in some cases, but not in the cases that cause a problem for the Humean response to the circularity objection. Bhogal (2020) and Dorst (2019a) both claim that the key is for the Humean to identify the differing aims of scientific and metaphysical explanation. Bhogal claims that scientific explanations are distinctively unificatory, so metaphysical explanations can chain with scientific explanations only in the cases where the metaphysical explanations contribute to unification.…”

Section: The Case Against Humeanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Humeanism about laws of nature

Bhogal

2020

Philosophy Compass

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Humeanism about laws of nature is, roughly, the view that the laws of nature are just patterns, or ways of describing patterns, in the mosaic of events. In this paper, I survey some of the (many!) objections that have been raised to Humeanism, considering how the Humean might respond. And I consider how we might make a positive case for Humeanism. The common thread running through all this is that the viability of the Humean view relies on the Humean having an importantly different conception of explanation to the anti‐Humean.

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Humean laws, explanatory circularity, and the aim of scientific explanation

Cited by 17 publications

References 42 publications

There is no measurement problem for Humeans

There is no measurement problem for Humeans

Lawful Humean explanations are not circular

Humeanism about laws of nature

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