Hurdles to International Terrorist Alliances: Lessons From Al Qaeda's Experience

Abstract

Despite the threat posed by international terrorist alliances, the conditions that foster and inhibit these relationships remain poorly understood. When seeking allies outside of their primary conflict and political market, groups struggle to forge credible commitments, particularly the requisite 'shadows of the future' and reputations conducive to cooperation, without third-party enforcers. Given their suspicious nature and strong in-group identities, terrorist groups sometimes balk at relinquishing independence for security. Alliances risk precipitating counterterrorism pressure, alienating constituents, and increasing the risk of betrayal. Even groups that enjoy alliance success, like Al Qaeda, experience these hurdles in their alliance. What helped to set Al Qaeda apart from most groups was its ability to navigate these obstacles, though some bedeviled its alliances efforts. This offers under-utilized opportunities for alliance disruption.

Honor Among Thieves: Understanding Rhetorical and Material Cooperation Among Violent Nonstate Actors

“…Weinstein 2007. Bacon 2017Bacon , 2018Blair, Horowitz, and Potter, forthcoming;Byman 2014;Shapiro 2013. 14.…”

Terrorist group survival as a measure of effectiveness

“…Why do terrorist groups work together? There are a number of hurdles to terrorist group cooperation (Bacon 2015). Bond and Bapat (2012) note that there are risks to terrorist group cooperation, as groups cannot trust each other.…”

Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation and Terror Activity

“…2 Alliances between terrorist groups however, are an exception rather than the rule, given that less than one percent (417 to be exact) of the 81,799 terror attacks conducted during 1970-2007 involved more than one terror outfit (Asal et al, 2016). This may be due to the inability of terror outfits, which are illegal organizations, to credibly overcome commitment issues in the absence of third-party enforcement (Bacon, 2017). 3 Further, a significant fraction of outfits does not exist for more than a year, thereby making it difficult for them to reliably pledge to certain behavioral patterns for the long term.…”

“…This may be due to the inability of terror outfits, which are illegal organizations, to credibly overcome commitment issues in the absence of third-party enforcement (Bacon, 2017). 3 Further, a significant fraction of outfits does not exist for more than a year, thereby making it difficult for them to reliably pledge to certain behavioral patterns for the long term. 4 In fact, a prominent reason proposed in the literature for inter-outfit cooperation, is the resultant enhancement of outfit longevity.…”