τότε ἐπιστάµεθα ὅταν τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδῶµεν -Aristotle, Posterior Analytics (71b31-2).
IntroductionEver since Hubert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall presented Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science (1982), the question of the relation of phenomenology to cognitive science has been, if not answered, at least discussed. Dreyfus tried to answer this question in terms of the work of Jerry Fodor. From a Husserlian "point of view," Dreyfus contended, "Fodor is rediscovering a very important discipline: the phenomenological theory of cognition, which Hume and Kant saw dimly and which Husserl brought into its own" ( 15). This answer, however, proved to be very unpopular (though see Pokropski 2020), and was immediately rejected by Husserlians, both before (McIntyre, 1986) and after (Brown, 1990; Woodruff Smith, 1995, 342) the discovery of the potential of neural networks as an explanatory apparatus for cognitive phenomena (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986;Smolensky, 1991).In light of the newfound promise of multilayer networks, and without heeding the warnings of the rediscoverer of phenomenological cognition (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988), the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences was born. The guiding framework for the journal was established by the work of Varela, Thompson, and