Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism

Drummond, John J.

doi:10.1007/978-94-009-1974-7

Cited by 158 publications

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“…Jetzt ist das reale Verhältnis, das vordem als wirklich bestehendes gemeint war, gestört. Die Wahrnehmung ist allein übrig, es ist nichts Wirkliches da, auf das sie sich bezieht» (Husserl 1950, p. 220). numerous interpretations of the doctrine of noema in Husserl; they can be divided into three groups: the ''objectivistic'' interpretation asserted by Gurwitsch (1975Gurwitsch ( , 1982, the ''intensionalistic'' (opposite to the former) asserted by Føllesdal (1982Føllesdal ( , 1990 and extended by Smith and McIntyre (1982), and a third group in which noema, as the intentional element in perception, is neither a part of the object nor a Fregean sense (Drummond 1992;Lanfredini 1994). Following the theoretical suggestion of the latter group and taking a position similar to that of Süssbauer (1995), I have asserted an ''ecological'' notion of noema in which this element of Husserl's phenomenological reduction is not merely an ''egological'' one, but an entity similar to ''matters of fact''; as such, it is an entity that can be considered in re, but as a sense of perception.…”

Section: Historical Evaluation Of the Phenomenological School From Thmentioning

confidence: 98%

The “Ecological” Approach to Ontology in Hedwig Conrad-Martius and in Some Authors of the Phenomenological School

Caputo¹

2008

Axiomathes

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Conrad-Martius' philosophy can be defined as a non-orthodox position in phenomenological ontology. This position can be considered such in a different sense from Heidegger's ontology and may be treated as an extension of Husserl's phenomenology in view of the following three elements. (1) Seiendes (entity) is considered anything that has consistence in the larger sense of the word, including all entities, such as fantastical entities (spirits, fairy-tale beings), soul, ideas and others, that can be used to obtain the phenomenological description.(2) The phenomenological description that occurs through a new definition of ''phenomenological reduction'' and epoché, in such a way that a realistic solution is emphasized in the analysis of being; being is not considered as the residuum of a system of noema, but, following medieval philosophy, as having the eminent character of reality, through which any of the others can be derived. (3) The analysis of being gives a stratification of various entities, through which each finds definition by means of its relative allocation in an ''ontological space''.

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Section: Historical Evaluation Of the Phenomenological School From Thmentioning

confidence: 98%

The “Ecological” Approach to Ontology in Hedwig Conrad-Martius and in Some Authors of the Phenomenological School

Caputo¹

2008

Axiomathes

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“…Cette compréhension logico-sémantique de base du noème est en jeu dans plusieurs de mes discussions dans Husserl, et elle sous-tend la doctrine sémantique discutée par Jean-Michel Roy. Drummond s'oppose depuis longtemps à cette explication du noème (voir Drummond, 1990). De manière conséquente, dans son commentaire sur Husserl, Drummond affi rme que « la doctrine de la corrélation noèse-noème […] est une doctrine phénoménologique, et non une doctrine ontologique ».…”

Section: Intentionnalité Noème Et Attitudeunclassified

“…La lecture de Marbach fait écho à un ancien ouvrage 5 et converge avec la ligne d'interprétation de Drummond (voir Drummond, 1990) et avec une étude précédente de Robert Sokolowski sur la phénoménologie et l'intentionnalité 6 . Je vais maintenant reconsidérer la doctrine du noème dans le présent contexte de discussion.…”

Section: Le Rôle Du Noème Dans Le Modèle Médiateur De L'intentionnalitéunclassified

Réponses à mes critiques

Smith

2009

Philosophiques

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“…In other words, it is not the purpose of this paper to clarify whether those objects exist in the same or in a different manner. Here, it must be enough to mention Smith and McIntyre's critique of Gurwitsch and the controversy betweenDrummond and McIntyre (Smith and McIntyre 1982; Gurwitsch 1964;Drummond 1990).4 If we are to talk about acts' components, it must be noted here that noesis is the second and ultimate part of experience; but the text distinguishes ''really inherent'' components from the noema, which is the ''not really inherent,'' ''intentional'' one(Hua III, pp. 200-222: 1982/211-233).…”

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confidence: 97%

Noema in the Light of Contradiction, Conflict, and Nonsense: The Noema as Possibly Thinkable Content

Kosowski

2008

Husserl Stud

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The present paper is guided by the belief that Edmund Husserl's concept of noema can be significantly enriched when considered in light of extreme epistemological instances. These include the phenomena of the absurd and nonsense, but also intentional conflict and cases of consciousness directed to contradictory objects. The paper shows that the noema, when experienced in such a context, exhibits interesting characteristics that are rather difficult to note in other circumstances. The paper consists of five sections. The first interprets and relates concepts from Logical Investigations to those from Ideas I. The second section discloses the noematic ability to assemble senses for which there is no corresponding object. The third section stresses that the noema must, in some instances, be able to comprise two separate structures of senses through which two different objects are meant. In the fourth section, all of these characteristics are shown to be restricted by the concept of nonsense and the laws of meaning-compounding. In this way, the noema is clarified as ''possibly thinkable content.'' Finally, in Sect. 5, this idea is brought into dialogue with the most significant interpretations of the noema.

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Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism

Cited by 158 publications

References 0 publications

The “Ecological” Approach to Ontology in Hedwig Conrad-Martius and in Some Authors of the Phenomenological School

The “Ecological” Approach to Ontology in Hedwig Conrad-Martius and in Some Authors of the Phenomenological School

Réponses à mes critiques

Noema in the Light of Contradiction, Conflict, and Nonsense: The Noema as Possibly Thinkable Content

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