Hybrid collective intentionality

Abstract

The theory of collective agency and intentionality is a flourishing field of research, and our understanding of these phenomena has arguably increased greatly in recent years. Extant theories, however, are still ill-equipped to explain certain aspects of collective intentionality. In this article we draw attention to two such underappreciated (and intertwined) aspects: the failure of the intentional states of collectives to supervene on the intentional states of their members, and the role of non-human factors in collective agency and intentionality (‘hybrid’ collective intentionality). We propose a theory of collective intentionality which builds on the ‘interpretationist’ tradition in metasemantics and the philosophy of mind as initiated by David Lewis and recently developed further by Robbie Williams. The collective-level analogue of interpretationism turns out to look different in some ways from the individual-level theory, but is well-suited to accommodating phenomena such as hybrid collective intentionality. Complemented with Kit Fine’s theory of variable embodiment, such a theory also provides a diachronic account of intentional collectives.

Radical Misinterpretation

“…If we want a theory that fully characterises intentionality in terms of the non‐intentional, we'd need add an independent, prior theory that tells us how to attribute a basic set of evidence propositions and choices to an agent. (Brouwer et al , 2021, p. 3381)…”

“…If we want a theory that fully characterises intentionality in terms of the non‐intentional, we'd need add an independent, prior theory that tells us how to attribute a basic set of evidence propositions and choices to an agent. (Brouwer et al , 2021, p. 3381)[The ‘Lewisean’ theory], even if it succeeds, only reduces the belief and desire facts to evidence and action facts. If the facts about Karl's evidence and actions are themselves representational facts, or if they are grounded in representational facts, then the proposal does not give us a completely reductive theory of the representational to the non‐representational.…”

Why group mental states are not exhaustively determined by member states

“…Other theorists, however, regard collections of people as a special sub-case. They analyze ships, scientific laboratories (including equipment), cities-things are sometimes called "socio-technical systems" or what Brouwer et al (2021) call "hybrid" entities. Particularly if social entities are to be understood holistically as cognizers, these theorists see no reason to limit their components to people.…”

“…The key feature for the current argument is that the social groups do not include things like ships or cities; but there are also issues pertaining to supervenience that may depend on a certain realism about social groups that some theorists dispute. 7 Indeed, this point is crucial for understanding a vast array of social entities and their cognition (see Brouwer et al (2021) for a sophisticated recent treatment). Corporations, for instance, are better understood as hybrids than as groups.…”

“…77Indeed, this point is crucial for understanding a vast array of social entities and their cognition (see Brouwer et al. (2021) for a sophisticated recent treatment). Corporations, for instance, are better understood as hybrids than as groups.…”