‘Hybrid Threats’: Neither Omnipotent Nor Unbeatable

Introduction ‘hybrid warfare in Asia: its meaning and shape’

“…In theory, the definition does neither preclude that various actors, state or non-state, may act in concert/in liaison with one another, nor rule out the broad range of methods used by hybrid state, non-state or combined actors, including criminal, cyber, or informational. (Bowers in this volume; Hoffman, 2010;Mansoor, 2012). The definition also has in mind the possibility that hybrid actors may choose targets to exploit various economic and social vulnerabilities of the opponent, hence indicating a broadening interface of warfare and the civilian world (Bowers in this volume; Liang and Xiangsui, 1999).…”

Hybrid threats and new challenges for multilateral intelligence cooperation

“…34 This new hybrid threat response within the EU provides a framework for describing the evolution of contemporary threat actors, challenging conventional threat assessment methods and elucidating the dynamics of the contemporary operating environment. 35 The role of the EU Joint Intelligence Centres (INTCEN) within the EU External Actions Service (EEAS) is to provide intelligence analysis, early warning and awareness of hybrid threats to various EU agencies and to EU member states. 36 The INTCEN does this by monitoring and evaluating hybrid threats and international events, with a particular focus on sensitive geographical areas, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.…”

Global Britain in the grey zone: Between stagecraft and statecraft

“…We argue these developments present a unique opportunity to connect academic and policy efforts to understand and counter hybrid strategies in all their guises. On the academic front, while we recognize there are no hybrid studies per se, an enduring research strand has nonetheless emerged across international relations (Hughes, 2020;Lanoszka, 2016Lanoszka, , 2019Weissmann et al, 2021) as well as strategic and security studies (Fridman et al, 2019;Galeotti, 2016Galeotti, , 2019Hoffman, 2007Hoffman, , 2009Hoffman, , 2010Hoffman, , 2018Mälksoo, 2018;Monaghan, 2019;Rauta, 2020a;Renz, 2016). On the policy front, we follow the shift in UK security and defense policy toward, as one Member of Parliament puts it, making sure that "[h]ybrid warfare is no longer an esoteric afterthoughtrather the whole lens through which influence and counter-influence must be focused, organised and fought" (Kearns, 2020; also see Seeley, 2018).…”