Hybrids and the Boundaries of Moral Considerability or Revisiting the Idea of Non-Instrumental Value

Abstract

The transgressive ontological character of hybrids-entities crossing the ontological binarism of naturalness and artificiality, e.g., biomimetic projects-calls for pondering the question of their ethical status, since metaphysical and moral ideas are often inextricably linked. The example of it is the concept of "moral considerability" and related to it the idea of "intrinsic value" understood as a non-instrumentality of a being. Such an approach excludes hybrids from moral considerations due to their instrumental character. In the paper, we revisit the boundaries of moral considerability by reexamining the legitimacy of identifying intrinsic value with a non-instrumental one. We offer the concept of "functional value," which we define as a simultaneous contribution to the common good of the ecosystem and the possibility to disclose the full variety of aspects of a being's identity. We argue that such a value of hybrids allows us to include them into the scope of moral considerability.

The Moral Consideration of Artificial Entities: A Literature Review

“…This is used as part of an argument refuting “the view that users enjoy virtual violence primarily because they are constantly aware that ‘this game is not real.’” Himma ( 2003 ) Himma discusses several claims that have been made in computer ethics, some of which relate to the moral patiency of computers and other artificial entities. Himma argues that computers do not currently have moral standing, though any future “instantiation of consciousness and understanding” in artificial entities would give them moral standing Himma ( 2004 ) Himma critiques several components and assumptions Floridi’s Information Ethics, such as that the historical process of moral circle expansion justified further expansion and that Floridi’s “information objects” are “radically different” from “the entities they describe” Hoffmann and Hahn ( 2020 ) Hoffman and Hahn argue that defining suffering is difficult, as is “knowing if someone or something that appears to be suffering is indeed actually doing so.” They argue in favor of “[t]hinking otherwise” and “an extreme and carefully articulated version of relativism.” They consider policy implications, such as that, “once AI can participate in the moral discourse, arguing credibly and convincingly for its rights, they shall be granted” Hogan ( 2017 ) This article evaluates the arguments put forward in Gunkel ( 2012 ) and argues that, “the machine question and the animal question are different questions,” including by arguing that these questions do not “phenomenologically appear as the same question in particular situations.” Hogan argues that the ideas of “aliveness” and the distinction between moral agency and patiency are “foundational to our very idea of human ethics” Holder et al ( 2016 ) The authors discuss several legal issues related to AI and robots, including “Robot-generated rights.” They conclude that, “rights relating to the types of IP that are protectable do not need to be updated as yet,” but that society may need to engage with the question of robot rights in the future Holm and Powell ( 2013 ) This article explores several issues in “synthetic biology,” which is described as having a “tendency to blur boundaries between supposedly discrete ontological categories, such as between organism and machine, living thing and artifact, ‘the natural’ and ‘the artificial’.” Holm and Powell summarize some relevant discussions by other contributors as to whether “the products of synthetic biology” have interests and warrant moral consideration Holy-Luczaj and Blok ( 2019 ) Holy-Luczaj and Blok consider whether “hybrids,” “entities crossing the ontological binarism of naturalness and artificiality,” have moral considerability. Drawin...…”

Metabolism Instead of Machine: Towards an Ontology of Hybrids

“…It challenges us to revisit old moral concepts and to invent new ones to account for such nuances. For instance, some have argued that, as a hybrid, a cell factory has no mere instrumental value, nor full intrinsic value, but rather functional value (Holy-Luczaj and Blok, 2021). In any case, uncovering, explicating and challenging the ontological assumptions about hybrids are important because of the normative implications of these projects.…”

“…Second, while hybrids are crucially important to both the philosophy of technology and environmental philosophy, their transgressive nature puts them in a blind spot for both fields. While environmental philosophy need not engage with technology, hybrids' blurring of lines between technology and nature urges us to include them in environmental philosophy debates (Holy-Luczaj and Blok, 2021). Synthetic biology is projected as a means of realising a bio-based economy in response to the heightened awareness of global ecological challenges.…”

“…They have been framed as artefactual organisms (Holm, 2012), synthetic organisms or living machines (Deplazes & Huppenbauer, 2009). Such hybrids blur traditional definitions that attempt to demarcate categories such as living beings, robots and machines (Bongard & Levin, 2021): they are neither purely natural nor purely artificial (Holy-Luczaj & Blok, 2021). The products of synthetic biology fit the criteria of technological artefacts only imperfectly, exhibiting qualities such as self-reproducibility that artefacts do not share (Schyfter, 2012).…”

Towards the Phenomenology of Hybrids as Regenerative Design and use – a Post-Heideggerian Account

“…Referring to Heidegger's phenomenology for conceptualising the status of hybrids has also another advantage. It facilitates detecting parallels between environmental philosophy and the philosophy of technology -both greatly influenced by Heidegger -which often pass unnoticed due to their insufficient dialogue (see Hoły-Łuczaj and Blok 2019). One of such omitted resemblances between them is an impact made by the Aristotelian categorisation of artefacts and nature.…”