Hydropower-based collaboration in South Asia: The case of India and Bhutan

The future of hydropower? A systematic review of the drivers, benefits and governance dynamics of transboundary dams

“…Another study documents a similar pattern in a more recent experience concerning cooperation efforts between Bhutan and India for the building of the Mangdecchu Dam, where the prospect of large infrastructure projects contributing to increase the GDP is reported as a key driver to embark on a series of shared hydropower development projects [71]. In other instances, such as in the joint development of the Harirud River, the literature reports that the incentive for cooperation was tied to potential trade spillovers, also related to potential increases economic growth, mentioned in Section 4.1. above [72].…”

“…Bhutan sells approximately 70% of its hydropower to India, and one of the most recent projects, the Mangdecchu Dam was fully funded by the Government of India with 60% grant and 40% loan. According to studies in our sample the tight relationship between both countries implies that, beyond hydropower, financial flows are fluid between both countries as a significant share of the development loans and other forms of financial assistance extended to Bhutan are channelled back to India [71,85]. India has also invested in hydropower development in Afghanistan through the Salma Dam, with a strong geopolitical undertone as reported in the studies in our sample, as it is a way that India exercises hegemonic influence over Afghanistan [61].…”

“…A third set of drivers is related to asymmetrical power, specifically where asymmetry concerns a disparity of resources in specified, relevant factors (military power, exploitation potential, financial resources), which in connection to concerns over security issues has led to transboundary hydropower cooperation. As mentioned in Section 4.1, asymmetries in demand might lead to arrangements where countries interested in affordable and sustainable electricity to fuel their growing industrialization, but with either lack sufficient local resources, or share control with other countries over transboundary resources, might team up with countries which would be in no condition to make investments to increase national energy supply due to lack of funds [50], but are allured by the prospects of increased electrification and strengthening their power sectors as observed in transboundary development involving the interaction between starkly unequal partners such as Paraguay and Brazil [54,55], Bhutan and India [69,71] or Lao PDR and Thailand [59,74,75].…”

Beyond hydropower: towards an integrated solution for water, energy and food security in South Asia

“…The per capita energy consumption in 2014 of 707 kWh was among the lowest in the world (average 3126 kWh); some 20% of the population lacks access to electricity (World Bank, 2018), and most of those with access experience shortages. South Asian countries have been facing huge economic losses from power outages (Abbas et al, 2018;Tortajada & Saklani, 2018). Demand is growing rapidly, however, with a present rate of 3.5% per year, which is expected to increase further, fuelled by economic growth, urbanization and a growing middle class.…”

Sectoral carbon linkages of Indian economy based on hypothetical extraction model

“…All of these indicators signal a growing demand for energy and a pressure on the Indian economy’s natural resources. Between 2000 and 2015 India’s energy demand almost doubled, the rapid industrialization, urbanization and production catalyzed by the “Make in India” initiative will drive this pattern to linger (Tortajada and Saklani, 2018). India is ranked third-largest emitter of CO 2 behind China and the USA; this holds true for India’s output and consumption-based emissions (Fan et al , 2016).…”