HYPNOTIC RESPONSIVENESS AND NONHYPNOTIC SUGGESTIBILITY: <i>DISPARATE, SIMILAR, OR THE SAME?</i>

Tasso, Anthony F.; Perez, Nicole; Moore, Mark E.; Griffo, Robert; Nash, Michael R.

doi:10.1080/00207144.2020.1685330

Cited by 14 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 80 publications

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“…The ability to control experience in response to suggestion is evident across perceptual and decision domains and there is much evidence that imaginative suggestion effects can be experienced as subjectively 'real' (see Lynn et al, 2020;McConkey, 2008), and that hypnotisability is distinct from social compliance (e.g. see Moore, 1964;Tasso et al, 2020; but see Polczyk & Pasek, 2006). In an explanatory framework, a domain general process subsumes domain specific demonstrations of its operation.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Serious Problems With Interpreting Rubber Hand “Illusion” Experiments

Roseboom

Lush

2022

Collabra: Psychology

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The rubber hand “illusion” (RHI), in which participants report experiences of ownership over a fake hand, appears to demonstrate that subjective ownership over one’s body can be easily disrupted. It was recently shown that existing methods of controlling for suggestion effects in RHI responding are invalid. It was also shown that propensity to agree with RHI ownership statements is correlated with trait phenomenological control (response to imaginative suggestion). There is currently disagreement regarding the extent to which this relationship may cofound interpretation of RHI measures. Here we present the results of simulated experiments to demonstrate that a relationship between trait phenomenological control and RHI responding of the size reported would fundamentally change the way existing RHI results must be interpreted. Using real participant data, each simulated experiment used a sample biased in selection for trait phenomenological control. We find that using experiment samples comprised only of participants higher in trait phenomenological control almost guarantees that an experiment provides evidence consistent with RHI. By contrast, samples comprised of only participants lower in trait phenomenological control find evidence for RHI only around half the time – and of greater concern, evidence specifically for “ownership” experience just 4% of the time. These findings clearly contradict claims that the magnitude of relationship between phenomenological control and RHI responding is a minor concern, demonstrating that the presence of participants higher in trait phenomenological control in a given RHI experiment sample is critical for finding evidence consistent with RHI. Further study and theorising regarding RHI (and related effects) must take into account the role that trait phenomenological control plays in participant experience and responses during RHI experiments.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Serious Problems With Interpreting Rubber Hand “Illusion” Experiments

Roseboom

Lush

2022

Collabra: Psychology

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“…2020 ). DVS does not include other forms of suggestibility or ‘suggestibilities’ such as non-verbal, placebo, interrogative suggestibility, or social compliances ( Kihlstrom 2008 ; Tasso and Pérez 2008 ; Tasso et al. 2020 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Editing reality in the brain

Walsh

Oakley

2022

Neuroscience of Consciousness

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Recent information technologies such as virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) allow the creation of simulated sensory worlds with which we can interact. Using programming language, digital details can be overlaid onto displays of our environment, confounding what is real and what has been artificially engineered. Natural language, particularly the use of direct verbal suggestion (DVS) in everyday and hypnotic contexts, can also manipulate the meaning and significance of objects and events in ourselves and others. In this review, we focus on how socially rewarding language can construct and influence reality. Language is symbolic, automatic and flexible and can be used to augment bodily sensations e.g. feelings of heaviness in a limb or suggest a colour that is not there. We introduce the term ‘suggested reality’ (SR) to refer to the important role that language, specifically DVS, plays in constructing, maintaining and manipulating our shared reality. We also propose the term edited reality to encompass the wider influence of information technology and linguistic techniques that results in altered subjective experience and review its use in clinical settings, while acknowledging its limitations. We develop a cognitive model indicating how the brain’s central executive structures use our personal and linguistic-based narrative in subjective awareness, arguing for a central role for language in DVS. A better understanding of the characteristics of VR, AR and SR and their applications in everyday life, research and clinical settings can help us to better understand our own reality and how it can be edited.

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“…Social compliance is a distinct concept to response to imaginative suggestion (e.g. Coe et al, 1973;Moore, 1964;Tasso et al, 2020; but see Polczyk & Pasek, 2006). It cannot, however, be ruled out that any given response on a hypnosis or phenomenological control scale (or indeed any subjective report scale) may reflect response due to social compliance such as faking or imagination rather than phenomenological control.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Phenomenological Control Scale: Measuring the Capacity for Creating Illusory Nonvolition, Hallucination and Delusion

Lush

Scott

Seth

et al. 2021

Collabra: Psychology

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Phenomenological control is the ability to generate experiences to meet expectancies. There are stable trait differences in this ability, as shown by responses to imaginative suggestions of, for example, paralysis, amnesia, and auditory, visual, gustatory and tactile hallucinations. Phenomenological control has primarily been studied within the context of hypnosis, in which suggestions are delivered following a hypnotic induction. Reports of substantial relationships between phenomenological control in a hypnotic context (hypnotizability) and experimental measures (e.g., the rubber hand illusion) suggest the need for a broad investigation of the influence of phenomenological control in psychological experiments. However, hypnosis is not required for successful response to imaginative suggestion. Because misconceptions about the hypnotic context may influence hypnotizability scores, a non-hypnotic scale which better matches the contextual expectancies of other experiments and avoids the hypnotic context is potentially better suited for such investigation. We present norms for the Phenomenological Control Scale (PCS), an adaptation of the Sussex Waterloo Scale of Hypnotizability (SWASH) which is free of the hypnotic context. Mean scores for the PCS are higher than for SWASH, and the subjective scales of PCS and SWASH show similar reliability. The PCS subjective scale is a reliable tool for measuring trait response to imaginative suggestion (i.e., phenomenological control) outside the context of hypnosis.

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HYPNOTIC RESPONSIVENESS AND NONHYPNOTIC SUGGESTIBILITY: DISPARATE, SIMILAR, OR THE SAME?

Cited by 14 publications

References 80 publications

Serious Problems With Interpreting Rubber Hand “Illusion” Experiments

Serious Problems With Interpreting Rubber Hand “Illusion” Experiments

Editing reality in the brain

The Phenomenological Control Scale: Measuring the Capacity for Creating Illusory Nonvolition, Hallucination and Delusion

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