2010
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00738.x
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

A Defense of Stable Invariantism

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
53
0

Year Published

2011
2011
2014
2014

Publication Types

Select...
5
3

Relationship

1
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 92 publications
(53 citation statements)
references
References 34 publications
0
53
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Nevertheless, because they are not completely certain that the defendant is guilty, it would not be rational for them to impose the death penalty and they decline to do so. (Reed , p. 232)…”
Section: Death Penalty Casementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nevertheless, because they are not completely certain that the defendant is guilty, it would not be rational for them to impose the death penalty and they decline to do so. (Reed , p. 232)…”
Section: Death Penalty Casementioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, she should check the case notes before she operates. Think of how bad it would be if she took out the wrong kidney” (see also Hill and Schechter 2007, Reed forthcoming, Neta forthcoming). In their discussion of such cases, two of the leading defenders of SSI, Fantl and McGrath (2009) claim that intuitions about cases are not decisive in determining whether sufficiency is true 11 .…”
Section: The Knowledge Norm For Practical Reasoningmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Sosa [1991], Greco [2002;2010]), or by being characteristically motivated (e.g. Montmarquet [1991], Battaly [2004]) toward this end.…”
Section: The Value Of Cognitive Abilitiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…3 Kvanvig suspects, and Riggs [2003] follows suit here, that it's understanding, rather than knowledge, that (i) our pre-theoretical intuitions license us to assume is something more valuable than mere true belief, and (ii) which accordingly belongs at the center of epistemological theory. 4 Reaching this conclusion rather differently, Duncan Pritchard [2010] argues that it is cognitive achievements-which he, following Greco [1993;2010] defines as cognitive successes primarily creditable to cognitive ability-that have special value, where cognitive achievement is, he argues, neither necessary 2 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting that, though the insight that knowledge has special epistemic value is a common insight (and one shared by many philosophers working on the value problem, e.g. especially those-viz.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%