Contemporary PresidencyThe Office of the Chief of Staff in the Trump White House, 2017–2019

Abstract

Focusing on White House chiefs of staff and the Office of the Chief of Staff during the first three years of the Donald Trump administration, we examine the office and its occupants in the context of past scholarship on White House structuring and staffing. We discuss four major roles performed by chiefs of staff and their deputies (administrator, advisor, guardian, proxy), exploring their participation in management and in policy processes. We also look at the larger chief of staff's office, noting continuities with, and changes from, previous presidencies. Probing the roles, activities, and performance of President Donald Trump's first three chiefs of staff underscores both the significance of individual presidents in governing and the apparent constraints on their doing so.

Assessing the Trump White House

“…In such a view, fulfilling responsibilities for outreach and communication like those Ouyang and Waterman (2020) examine points to more important evaluative criteria. It is consistent as well with the Cohen and Hult (2020) observation that under Trump, distinctions began to appear between the "president" and the "White House," with aides racing to counter, explain, redirect, or bury presidential tweets and statements at rallies. The interplay of neglect of major problems like public health and climate change, shifts in the U.S. position in the world, the loss of key sources of expertise in government, and weakening norms may exacerbate at least two of the features of "constitutional rot" (Balkin 2018) 8 : "policy disasters" and loss of trust in government and other citizens.…”

“…Even so, it had an especially difficult start, after the president‐elect interrupted the postelection transition by dismissing his transition director, Chris Christie, and the subsequent discarding of the transition team's files; the process was delayed further by the need for the new transition chief, Vice President‐elect Mike Pence, to undergo security clearance. Competition among potential staffers began after the election and continued with the formal move to the White House (see, e.g., Cohen and Hult 2020). According to Woodward, “chaos and disorder were inadequate to describe the situation.…”

“…Trump himself devoted considerable amounts of his workday to “executive time,” frequently staying in the residence until late morning and watching television news throughout the day. Executive time permitted him to talk with many beyond the staff, including longtime associates and outside supporters, on topics including tariffs, Iran, and immigration (Cohen and Hult 2020). Chiefs of staff mostly failed in their efforts to sustain routine reporting and advising channels, with final chief Mark Meadows rarely trying to do so but concentrating instead on communications and domestic policy.…”

“…including longtime associates and outside supporters, on topics including tariffs, Iran, and immigration (Cohen and Hult 2020). Chiefs of staff mostly failed in their efforts to sustain routine reporting and advising channels, with final chief Mark Meadows rarely trying to do so but concentrating instead on communications and domestic policy.…”

The Random Walk Presidency

“…Instead, Trump announced that Priebus would be “equal partners” with Chief Strategist Steve Bannon. Priebus had neither sufficient authority nor the president's backing, and the staff immediately devolved into “leaking, backbiting, and general pandemonium” (Cohen and Hult 2020, 396). This result was entirely predictable, as any former chief of staff, or any presidential scholar, knew.…”