I Dare You to Punish Me—Vendettas in Games of Cooperation

Fehl, Katrin; Sommerfeld, Ralf D.; Semmann, Dirk; Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen; Milinski, Manfred

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045093

Cited by 29 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…People are relatively rigid when punishing, but they still exhibit some flexibility; our model does not explain when or how this occurs. Our model does not allow agents to abstain from future interactions (38) or to counterpunish (4). Our formal evolutionary analysis uses a static framework, which is only an approximation for more accurate dynamic models.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We approach this question through both a game-theoretic model of punishment and agentbased simulations that allow for the evolution of the rewards that guide learning. We demonstrate that the evolution of punishment depends on the learning dynamics of competing flexible agents, and that this interaction between learning and evolution can produce individuals with innate "social preferences," such as a taste for revenge (1)(2)(3)(4).…”

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confidence: 97%

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Evolution of flexibility and rigidity in retaliatory punishment

Morris

MacGlashan

Littman

et al. 2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Natural selection designs some social behaviors to depend on flexible learning processes, whereas others are relatively rigid or reflexive. What determines the balance between these two approaches? We offer a detailed case study in the context of a two-player game with antisocial behavior and retaliatory punishment. We show that each player in this game-a "thief" and a "victim"-must balance two competing strategic interests. Flexibility is valuable because it allows adaptive differentiation in the face of diverse opponents. However, it is also risky because, in competitive games, it can produce systematically suboptimal behaviors. Using a combination of evolutionary analysis, reinforcement learning simulations, and behavioral experimentation, we show that the resolution to this tension-and the adaptation of social behavior in this game-hinges on the game's learning dynamics. Our findings clarify punishment's adaptive basis, offer a case study of the evolution of social preferences, and highlight an important connection between natural selection and learning in the resolution of social conflicts. punishment | evolution | reinforcement learning | game theory | commitment H uman social behavior is sometimes remarkably rigid, and other times remarkably flexible. A key challenge for evolutionary theory is to understand why. That is, when will natural selection favor "reflexive" social behaviors, and when will it instead favor more flexible processes that guide social decisionmaking by learning?We investigate a case study of this problem that illuminates some general principles of the evolution of social cognition. Specifically, we model the dynamic between antisocial behavior and retaliatory punishment in repeated relationships. Our goal is to understand when natural selection will favor flexibility (e.g., "try stealing and see if you can get away with it") versus rigidity ("punish thieves no matter what"). We approach this question through both a game-theoretic model of punishment and agentbased simulations that allow for the evolution of the rewards that guide learning. We demonstrate that the evolution of punishment depends on the learning dynamics of competing flexible agents, and that this interaction between learning and evolution can produce individuals with innate "social preferences," such as a taste for revenge (1-4). The Evolution of Retaliatory PunishmentIndividuals often punish those who harm them, even at a cost to themselves (5, 6). The adaptive rationale of this behavior seems clear in repeated or reputational interactions: Punishment promises a long-run gain by deterring social partners from doing future harm. This logic was classically formalized with a simple two-party repeated game (5) (Fig. 1A). On each round, a thief has the option to either steal from a victim (earning s and inflicting a cost −s) or do nothing. In response, the victim may either punish (paying a cost −c to inflict a cost −p) or do nothing. Formal analysis shows that "punish all theft/stop stealing from victims who punish" is ev...

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 97%

Evolution of flexibility and rigidity in retaliatory punishment

Morris

MacGlashan

Littman

et al. 2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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“…Direct punishment is typically costly because it requires time and effort to enact, and the punisher bears the risk of retaliation21222324, which is why such punishment has been termed ‘altruistic'13. However, punishment can also occur indirectly by means of withholding help20.…”

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confidence: 99%

Altruistic punishment does not increase with the severity of norm violations in the field

Balafoutas

Nikiforakis²,

Rockenbach

2016

Nat Commun

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The degree of human cooperation among strangers is a major evolutionary puzzle. A prominent explanation is that cooperation is maintained because many individuals have a predisposition to punish those violating group-beneficial norms. A critical condition for cooperation to evolve in evolutionary models is that punishment increases with the severity of the violation. Here we present evidence from a field experiment with real-life interactions that, unlike in lab experiments, altruistic punishment does not increase with the severity of the violation, regardless of whether it is direct (confronting a violator) or indirect (withholding help). We also document growing concerns for counter-punishment as the severity of the violation increases, indicating that the marginal cost of direct punishment increases with the severity of violations. The evidence suggests that altruistic punishment may not provide appropriate incentives to deter large violations. Our findings thus offer a rationale for the emergence of formal institutions for promoting large-scale cooperation among strangers.

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“…There is overwhelming evidence that subjects are willing to sanction free riders at a cost to themselves (11)(12)(13)(14), although individuals typically refuse to exert second-order punishment (15). However, peer punishment can have detrimental consequences on welfare, as the punishment costs may override the benefits of increased cooperation (16) and due to the problems of antisocial punishment (17) and retaliation (18,19). Peer punishment may pay in the long run, but only when interactions take place in small and stable groups (20).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment

Hilbe

Traulsen

Röhl

et al. 2013

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Individuals usually punish free riders but refuse to sanction those who cooperate but do not punish. This missing second-order peer punishment is a fundamental problem for the stabilization of cooperation. To solve this problem, most societies today have implemented central authorities that punish free riders and tax evaders alike, such that second-order punishment is fully established. The emergence of such stable authorities from individual decisions, however, creates a new paradox: it seems absurd to expect individuals who do not engage in second-order punishment to strive for an authority that does. Herein, we provide a mathematical model and experimental results from a public goods game where subjects can choose between a community with and without second-order punishment in two different ways. When subjects can migrate continuously to either community, we identify a bias toward institutions that do not punish tax evaders. When subjects have to vote once for all rounds of the game and have to accept the decision of the majority, they prefer a society with second-order punishment. These findings uncover the existence of a democracy premium. The majority-voting rule allows subjects to commit themselves and to implement institutions that eventually lead to a higher welfare for all.evolution of cooperation | pool punishment | institution formation T he success of collective action and the maintenance of commonly shared infrastructure is often endangered by free riders, subjects who reap the benefits of public goods without contributing to them (1, 2). To mitigate the free riders' destructive potential, many communities install specialized authorities that monitor the subjects' behavior and sanction wrong-doers (3-7). Examples, such as modern courts and the police system, indicate that the maintenance of such institutions is costly. They also constitute a commonly shared infrastructure, which can be exploited just as the original public good that the institution was designed for to protect. Thus, a second-order dilemma arises.Second-order dilemmas appear in various forms and are considered as a serious obstacle to the evolution of cooperation (8-10). For example, in the absence of a policing authority, group members may take the job onto themselves, punishing others directly. There is overwhelming evidence that subjects are willing to sanction free riders at a cost to themselves (11-14), although individuals typically refuse to exert second-order punishment (15). However, peer punishment can have detrimental consequences on welfare, as the punishment costs may override the benefits of increased cooperation (16) and due to the problems of antisocial punishment (17) and retaliation (18,19). Peer punishment may pay in the long run, but only when interactions take place in small and stable groups (20). These restrictions may be the reason why modern states have abolished decentralized sanctioning (21).To explain the transition from decentralized peer punishment to institutional pool punishment (22), recent theoretic...

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I Dare You to Punish Me—Vendettas in Games of Cooperation

Cited by 29 publications

References 59 publications

Evolution of flexibility and rigidity in retaliatory punishment

Evolution of flexibility and rigidity in retaliatory punishment

Altruistic punishment does not increase with the severity of norm violations in the field

Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment

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