<i>De Facto</i>Judicial Independence and Physical Integrity Rights

Abouharb, M. Rodwan; Moyer, Laura P.; Schmidt, Megan

doi:10.1080/14754835.2013.812461

Cited by 19 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 72 publications

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“…19 Our results also show how strong an outlier Brunei is (the dummy is not included in columns 3 and 5, because the country is not in the sample). Our findings align well with those of Abouharb et al (2013), who relate judicial independence to physical integrity rights and find a positive association, indicating the relevance of the design of legal institutions for policies that concern a protected individual sphere. Similarly, Crabtree and Nelson (2017) find a robust relationship between judicial independence and improvements in empowerment rights.…”

Section: Findings For the Personal Freedom Indexsupporting

confidence: 88%

Securing personal freedom through institutions: the role of electoral democracy and judicial independence

Berggren

Gutmann

2020

Eur J Law Econ

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We investigate empirically how electoral democracy and judicial independence relate to personal freedom. While judicial independence is positively and robustly related to personal freedom in all its forms, electoral democracy displays a robust, positive relationship with only two out of seven types of personal freedom (freedom of association, assembly and civil society; freedom of expression and information). Interaction terms and more refined indicators of the political system reveal that countries without elections or with only one political party benefit more from judicial independence than both democracies and multi-party systems without free elections.

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Section: Findings For the Personal Freedom Indexsupporting

confidence: 88%

Securing personal freedom through institutions: the role of electoral democracy and judicial independence

Berggren

Gutmann

2020

Eur J Law Econ

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“…The role that independent judiciaries have in promoting property rights and good governance has been largely examined in the literature (Feld & Voigt, 2003;Henisz, 2000). Abouharb et al (2013) found that greater levels of de facto independence improved respect for physical integrity rights. Other scholars have found that de jure judicial independence can vary internally and externally (Ingram & Kapiszewski, 2019).…”

Section: From An International To a State Norm Cyclementioning

confidence: 99%

Does the Inter-American Court of Human Rights affect the development of human rights norms in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala?

Martinez

2023

International Studies

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Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador have struggled to adopt measures of accountability and support for human rights norms since the end of the civil conflicts in the region. Many victims and activists have taken their cases to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to gain reparations and accountability. How effective is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights at advancing human rights norms related to the cases it examines? I examine this question by developing the ‘domestic norm cycle’ theory, which extends Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) norm cycle theory. This theory captures how the ‘internalization’ of a norm takes place by examining political institutions. I argue that we can observe various stages of the ‘domestic norms cycle’ to examine how close or far the state is to fully adopting the norm. Although this article examines the levels of compliance with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, this theory can be applied to examine how external factors influence the development of human rights norms. This study has significant implications for how we observe support for human rights practices.

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“…Accordingly, citizens will be more likely to bring allegations before courts if they believe that courts are "willing and capable of imposing penalties for rights violations" (Powell and Staton, 2009: 154). When judicial institutions are not independent from political control, individuals whose rights are violated might not want to take their cases to courts in order to seek justice (Abouharb et al, 2013;Powell and Staton, 2009;Simmons, 2009).…”

Section: Judicial Independence and Refugee Flightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ultimately, I argue that when judges are unable to decide impartially and enforce their decisions, they will not be able to prevent the executive from intimidating, censoring and prosecuting the citizens. If judiciaries are not free from political interference, they cannot provide a shield against arbitrary government action and consequently governments' respect for citizens' rights deteriorates (Abouharb et al, 2013;Keith, 2002;Powell and Staton, 2009). In addition, judges' tendencies to decide a dispute based either on the law or on the political positions of those who take legal actions affect citizens' experiences and thus their confidence with the judicial system (Abouharb et al, 2013).…”

Section: Judicial Independence and Refugee Flightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If judiciaries are not free from political interference, they cannot provide a shield against arbitrary government action and consequently governments' respect for citizens' rights deteriorates (Abouharb et al, 2013;Keith, 2002;Powell and Staton, 2009). In addition, judges' tendencies to decide a dispute based either on the law or on the political positions of those who take legal actions affect citizens' experiences and thus their confidence with the judicial system (Abouharb et al, 2013). Such environments lead people to feel that their safety is at risk and flee their home countries.…”

Section: Judicial Independence and Refugee Flightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Judicial independence and refugee flights

Imamoğlu

2022

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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Recent studies suggest that a lack of judicial independence increases the risk of violent action, diminishing the incentives to solve disputes peacefully. However, violent action is not the only option when judiciaries are under the control of the executive. I argue that individuals become refugees in countries with non-independent judiciaries, losing their hope that violations of rules by the executive or privileged groups will be tried fairly. Using data from 181 countries over the 1976–2015 period, I find evidence that the lack of judicial independence leads countries to produce more refugees than others.

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De FactoJudicial Independence and Physical Integrity Rights

Cited by 19 publications

References 72 publications

Securing personal freedom through institutions: the role of electoral democracy and judicial independence

Securing personal freedom through institutions: the role of electoral democracy and judicial independence

Does the Inter-American Court of Human Rights affect the development of human rights norms in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala?

Judicial independence and refugee flights

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