<i>Epistemic Norms without Voluntary Control</i>

Chuard, Philippe; Southwood, Nicholas

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00721.x

Cited by 46 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Third, the claim that we have indirect influence over our doxastic states does not amount to doxastic voluntarism, if what I have to say in the rest of this section is right. See Alston (1988) and Chuard and Southwood (2009) for further arguments against using this notion to rescue deontology. heavy psychological or emotional investment in a proposition leads to gross selfdeception.…”

Section: The Anti-voluntarism Argumentmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…On closer examination, however, it is highly questionable. Such closer examination was carried out for the first time, to my knowledge, in a recent paper by Chuard and Southwood (2009); many of the following points are also made by them. 51 The move goes from this principle:…”

Section: The 'Ought Implies Can' Argument For (P1)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Besides the two kinds of argument considered here, some other possible defences are considered and rejected byChuard and Southwood (2009).46 This kind of argument is considered, though not ultimately endorsed, byWeatherson (2008). The example of digestion comes from him.…”

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confidence: 98%

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Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness

McHugh

2011

Erkenn

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We tend to prescribe and appraise doxastic states in terms that are broadly deontic. According to a simple argument, such prescriptions and appraisals are improper, because they wrongly presuppose that our doxastic states are voluntary. One strategy for resisting this argument, recently endorsed by a number of philosophers, is to claim that our doxastic states are in fact voluntary (This strategy has been pursued by Steup 2008; Weatherson 2008). In this paper I argue that this strategy is neither successful nor necessary. Our doxastic states are not voluntary in any interesting sense. But once we see why our doxastic states are not voluntary, we can also see that there is no apparent reason to think that deontic prescriptions and appraisals-epistemic ones, at any rate-presuppose doxastic voluntarism. Indeed, there is good reason to deny that they do so. Finally, I diagnose the misleading attraction of the idea that what I call 'epistemic deontology' presupposes doxastic voluntarism.

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Section: The Anti-voluntarism Argumentmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: The 'Ought Implies Can' Argument For (P1)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness

McHugh

2011

Erkenn

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“…is widely taken to be the central question of ethics; many epistemologists have taken as their central concern a notion of justification which is deontic doubts that justification is a deontic notion but suggests that, if it is, it is a permissive notion. For reasons not to share Alston's doubts, see Chuard and Southwood 2009;McHugh 2012. 5 For objectivism about justification, see, e.g.…”

Section: In View Of This It Is Unsurprising That Just As There Is Amentioning

confidence: 99%

If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ

Way

Whiting

2015

Philos Stud

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In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs about what you ought to do must be true, based in part on the idea that that the epistemic and practical domains are uniform, in a sense we spell out. We conclude by sketching possible implications of our discussion for the debates over what is wrong with akrasia and pragmatic encroachment on justified belief and knowledge.

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“…Thus, such views of justification run afoul of skepticism. For some responses to Alston's line of argument see Chuard and Southwood, ; Engel, ; Ginet, ; Heller, ; Hieronymi, ; Owens, ; Shah, ; and Steup, .…”

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confidence: 99%

The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification

Silva

2015

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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According to many, to have epistemic justification to believe P is just for it to be epistemically permissible to believe P. Others think it is for believing P to be epistemically good. Yet others think it has to do with being epistemically blameless in believing P. All such views of justification encounter problems. Here, a new view of justification is proposed according to which justification is a kind of composite normative status. The result is a view of justification that offers hope of solving some longstanding epistemological problems.

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Epistemic Norms without Voluntary Control

Cited by 46 publications

References 16 publications

Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness

Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness

If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ

The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification

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