<i>International Organization</i> and the Study of World Politics

Katzenstein, Peter J.; Keohane, Robert O.; Krasner, Stephen D.

doi:10.1017/s002081830003558x

Cited by 359 publications

(136 citation statements)

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“…Here Postema's analysis can be seen as a clarification of the large body of 'constructivist' literature in international law and international relations, which has sought to make sense of the constitutive role of norms and expectations. The international constructivist work characteristically emphasizes that the communicative force of custom (including any normative force it might have) derives from reciprocal 'intersubjective understandings' that states and other actors have about behaviour (Wendt 1995;Franck 1990;Katzenstein et al 1998). Where some constructivist scholars have adopted Lon Fuller's 'interactional' theory of law as an account of custom's normativity (Brunee and Toope 2000), Postema offers a more precise account of when and why 'interaction' matters.…”

Section: The Concept Of Custommentioning

confidence: 99%

The Nature of Customary Law

Roughan

2009

Res Publica

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This collection of essays offers an overdue re-examination of some of the most important puzzles surrounding the idea of custom and its relationship to law. Although the title of the book suggests that the phenomenon for examination is 'customary law,' the essays within are most impressive as a series of insights into how custom itself should be understood, and what its implications are for legal theory. The book is best approached, and is most interesting, as an insight into the 'jurisprudence of custom,' albeit one which proceeds through discrete and sometimes only loosely connected essays. It examines what legal theorists, philosophers, and historians might want to know about custom; or what might puzzle them about custom, in contrast to the kinds of questions that anthropological, psychological, or sociological studies might ask.These questions include the thorny issue of the relationship between custom and law: is custom a source of law or a type of law? Does custom turn into law or law into custom? Can custom be authoritative and, if so, in what sense? They are the same questions that scholars in legal philosophy, legal history, and legal theory have yet to satisfactorily answer; sometimes because they have been given insufficient attention, but other times, because the attention they have received comes in approaches to law no longer considered convincing or desirable. Though most of these questions remain outstanding at the end of this book-which is not and does not claim to be a definitive account of custom or customary law-substantial progress is made in explaining the concept of custom, exploring the role of custom in the theories of key philosophers and common lawyers, and offering a way past the stagnant debates about the idea of customary international law. For anyone interested in attempting to build a jurisprudence of custom, this book serves as an indispensable provocation of some of the most pressing puzzles.

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Section: The Concept Of Custommentioning

confidence: 99%

The Nature of Customary Law

Roughan

2009

Res Publica

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“…35. As Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998 argue, common knowledge is an important point of intersection between constructivist and rationalist approaches to international politics. See also Finnemore and Sikkink 1998.…”

Section: Constructivism and Institutional Emergencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…10. Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998. Note that the article does not engage in the wider controversy between rationalist and constructivist approaches.…”

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confidence: 99%

Constructing the International Foundations of E-Commerce—The EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Arrangement

Farrell¹

2003

Int Org

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Much recent international relations scholarship has argued that states are unable to control e-commerce, so that private actors are coming to play a dominant role. However, this body of literature fails to account for emerging “hybrid institutions,” in which states create general frameworks of rules, which are then implemented by private actors. This article examines a prominent example of such an institution, the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor arrangement in the field of privacy, and sets out an alternative explanation of state–private actor relations in the sphere of e-commerce. It shows how Safe Harbor had its origins in efforts by the European Union (EU) and United States to mitigate problems of interdependence that threatened to undermine the principles of order on which their regulatory systems were based. Safe Harbor reflects neither the EU nor U.S. approach, but rather a novel blend of state and private regulation. The article demonstrates the vital role of argument and persuasion in identifying Safe Harbor as a solution, and in negotiating its particulars. It finds that conventional game-theoretic accounts of bargaining are unable to explain the negotiation of Safe Harbor, and argues that constructivist approaches should pay more attention to how argument can disclose new possibilities of action.

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“…Since the 1990s, one of the major debates in International Relations (IR) scholarship has been between rationalism and constructivism (Katzenstein et al, 1998;Fearon and Wendt, 2002). How to define the relationship between rationality and norms or identity has been one of the main issues in this debate.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rationality, norms and identity in international relations

Choi

2014

Int Polit

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This article examines major debates between rationalism and constructivism.It presents that there are politically significant motives of social actions, including norms and identity, which cannot be completely subsumed by the concept of instrumental rationality. These ideational or social-psychological motivations are governed primarily by thymos or affect (the moral or emotional part of the human personality) and/or valueoriented rationality. We need more flexible assumptions about main actors and their motives than those of rationalism to explain appropriately the politics of anger, loyalty and a sense of justice at international levels. However, constructivism's emphasis on ideational motivations cannot totally replace rationalism in explaining international political life. Constructivism maintains that identity or norms are causally prior to actors' interests. Yet when there is conflict between pursuit of interests and maintenance of identity or norms, actors' strong and well-defined self-interests can overrule their contested or unstable identity or norms. In short, causal arrows can flow in either direction between identity or norms and interests. This implies that rationalism and constructivism are complementary rather than competitive in explaining international political life.

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International Organization and the Study of World Politics

Cited by 359 publications

References 1 publication

The Nature of Customary Law

The Nature of Customary Law

Constructing the International Foundations of E-Commerce—The EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Arrangement

Rationality, norms and identity in international relations

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