k‐strong privacy for radio frequency identification authentication protocols based on physically unclonable functions

Abstract

This paper examines Vaudenay's privacy model, which is one of the first and most complete privacy models that featured the notion of different privacy classes. We enhance this model by introducing two new generic adversary classes, k‐strong and k‐forward adversaries where the adversary is allowed to corrupt a tag at most k times. Moreover, we introduce an extended privacy definition that also covers all privacy classes of Vaudenay's model. In order to achieve highest privacy level, we study low cost primitives such as physically unclonable functions (PUFs). The common assumption of PUFs is that their physical structure is destroyed once tampered. This is an ideal assumption because the tamper resistance depends on the ability of the attacker and the quality of the PUF circuits. In this paper, we have weakened this assumption by introducing a new definition k‐resistant PUFs. k‐PUFs are tamper resistant against at most k attacks; that is, their physical structure remains still functional and correct until at most kth physical attack. Furthermore, we prove that strong privacy can be achieved without public‐key cryptography using k PUF‐based authentication. We finally prove that our extended proposal achieves both reader authentication and k‐strong privacy. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A Comparison Survey Study on RFID Based Anti-Counterfeiting Systems

“…They did present architectures for processing RFID event data and included their experience and performance for prototype implementation; also, they presented business considerations for RFID usage of participants in the pharmaceutical supply chain. In [53], the authors proposed a new mutual authentication protocol in RFID systems that uses an ID tag encrypted with a hash function and a stream cipher-based OTP by a challenge-response pair of PUFs, which was invented by Naccache and Fremanteau in 1992 [54]. Thus, there is no crucial disclosure problem in the protocol.…”

“…In [60], autonomic tracing of production processes with mobile agent-based computing (highly dynamic and cooperative, based on the idea of considering the closest provider to a buyer) was proposed; it relies on the use of agent-based ubiquitous computing technologies. In [53], the authors proposed a new mutual authentication protocol in RFID systems that uses an ID tag which is encrypted with a hash function and a stream cipher-based OTP by a challenge−response PUF [54]. There is no crucial disclosure problem in this protocol as the OTP is generated by using a NLM-128 generator which is simple, easy to implement in the hardware and software and highly secure as any one-way hash function can produce most of OTPs.…”

Towards a Unified Security Model for Physically Unclonable Functions

“…-Restricted unclonability is equivalent to EUF-CMA security -Indistinguishability implies EUF-CMA security and one-wayness -No implication between one-wayness and EUF-CMA security -Pseudorandomness implies indistinguishability -(MP, n, |R|, λ, )-min-entropy implies (MP, n, , δ 1 , )-EUF-CMA security -(MP, n, |R|, log |R|, )-min-entropy implies (MP, n, , )-pseudorandomness. 4 Comparison to Existing Security Models 5 We do not limit the number of physical attacks the adversary can mount as defined in [18]. Instead, the pamter-resilience assures there is no extra information is leaked by the physical attacks.…”