Sense of agency is an area of growing research interest with important implications for our understanding of consciousness; motor control; psychiatric symptoms, such as passivity phenomena; hypnosis; and the neuropsychological basis of moral and legal responsibility. These seemingly disparate research topics all overlap in a push toward increasingly specific models of the subjective phenomenology of action. In December 2013, a group of cognitive scientists, philosophers, and clinicians working on sense of agency gathered for a workshop at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia. The collection of articles in this special issue presents a selection of ideas that have developed from that meeting and demonstrates some of the latest thinking on the theory, methods, and application of agency research. The issue begins with discussion and critiques of theoretical accounts of sense of agency, including a proposal for refinements of the comparator model (Carruthers, 2015, pp. 210-221) and a reevaluation of links between ownership and agency (Morgan, 2015, pp. 222-236). These contributions are followed by articles that examine methodological issues in empirical sense of agency research. The intentional binding technique is one of the main methods that contemporary researchers use to assess sense of agency, and a number of contributors focused on the mechanisms that underlie this methodology. A collection of experiments tested the importance of causality (Buehner, 2015, pp. 237-252), identityspecific sensory predictions (Bednark, Poonian, Palghat, McFadyen, & Cunnington, 2015, pp. 253-268), and individual differences in psychosis-like experiences and age (Graham, Martin-Iverson, & Waters, 2015, pp. 269-282) for understanding findings from the intentional binding task. This special issue also provides new empirical and theoretical findings relevant to clinical disorders of agency, including the finding of an association between the variability of intention judgments and schizotypy (Moore & Bravin, 2015, pp. 283-290), a conceptual account of how predictive coding may explain thought insertion (Ger