<i>Norms of Assertion</i>

Lackey, Jennifer

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00664.x

Cited by 384 publications

(262 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…(Bach, 2008;Bach & Harnish, 1979) The justification account you should assert Q only if believing Q is justified (or: reasonable) for you. (Douven, 2006;Lackey, 2007) Belief is not factive, because you can believe something false. And virtually everyone agrees that justification is not factive either, because it seems obvious that you can be justified in believing something false.…”

Section: A Synopsis Of Competing Accountsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But earlier treatments have met with sustained criticism (e.g. Kvanvig, 2009;Lackey, 2007) and have not been developed in detail or with an eye toward empirical confirmation. Here I advance the discussion by identifying the phenomenon of excuse validation, experimentally establishing an approximate baseline frequency, and experimentally establishing that participant response to cases of justified false assertions fits the observed pattern of excuse validation.…”

Section: Excuse Validationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion

Turri

2013

Cognition

103

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a b s t r a c tAssertion is fundamental to our lives as social and cognitive beings. Philosophers have recently built an impressive case that the norm of assertion is factive. That is, you should make an assertion only if it is true. Thus far the case for a factive norm of assertion been based on observational data. This paper adds experimental evidence in favor of a factive norm from six studies. In these studies, an assertion's truth value dramatically affects whether people think it should be made. Whereas nearly everyone agreed that a true assertion supported by good evidence should be made, most people judged that a false assertion supported by good evidence should not be made. The studies also suggest that people are consciously aware of criteria that guide their evaluation of assertions. Evidence is also presented that some intuitive support for a non-factive norm of assertion comes from a surprising tendency people have to misdescribe cases of blameless rule-breaking as cases where no rule is broken.

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Section: A Synopsis Of Competing Accountsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Excuse Validationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion

Turri

2013

Cognition

103

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“…Recognising the important role that assertion plays in the formation of beliefs in others, some argue that assertion should be understood to be governed by a particular rule which outlines when it is correct to make an assertion. Perhaps the most popular of these is the 'knowledge norm' of assertion (Williamson 2000), which states that one must assert p only if one knows p. Other attempts to formulate a norm of assertion have opted for a weaker epistemological constraint, namely, where knowledge may be substituted for either 'justification' (Lackey 2007;Kvanvig 2009), or 'truth' (Whiting 2015. These norms of assertion, like rules in a game, are constitutive, in that they define what it is to play that game.…”

Section: Knowledge From Testimonymentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Insult and Compliment a Testifier

Malcolm¹

2016

Episteme

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Do we insult, offend or slight a speaker when we refuse her testimony? Do we compliment, commend or extol a speaker when we accept her testimony? I argue that the answer to both of these questions is "yes", but only in some instances, since these respective insults and compliments track the reasons a hearer has for rejecting or accepting testimony. When disbelieving a speaker, a hearer may insult her because she judges the speaker to be either incompetent as a knower or insincere as a teller. However, there are many instances where we reject testimony without making this negative evaluation of the speaker, and as such, without paying her an insult. Testimonial compliments are fewer in number, and are not constitutive of "everyday" testimonial exchanges, since, speakers who are competent as knowers and sincere as tellers are merely behaving correctly in accordance with the norms of testifying. Nevertheless, deferring to an authority on belief can be complimentary to that speaker if by doing so we judge her to have some mastery in a particular domain. Testimonial insults and compliments have important moral implications, particularly with regard to epistemic injustice and therapeutic trust.

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“…16 Of course, to say this much is not to explain why Martin cannot outright assert that the computer screen is blue. One strategy is to appeal to the idea that there's some kind of pragmatic impropriety here (Weiner 2005;Lackey 2007; thanks to Allan Hazlett for suggesting this). I'm sceptical that this kind of explanation can be made to work (compare McGlynn 2011: §8), and so I need to offer an alternative.…”

Section: Risk-minimisation and Normic Supportmentioning

confidence: 99%

Justification as ‘Would-Be’ Knowledge

McGlynn¹

2012

Episteme

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In light of the failure of attempts to analyse knowledge as a species of justified belief, a number of epistemologists have suggested that we should instead understand justification in terms of knowledge. This paper focuses on accounts of justification as a kind of ‘would-be’ knowledge. According to such accounts a belief is justified just in case any failure to know is due to uncooperative external circumstances. I argue against two recent accounts of this sort due to Alexander Bird and Martin Smith. A further aim is to defend a more traditional conception, according to which justification is a matter of sufficiently high evidential likelihood. In particular, I suggest that this conception of justification offers a plausible account of lottery cases: cases in which one believes a true proposition – for example that one's lottery ticket will lose – on the basis of probabilistic evidence.

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Norms of Assertion

Cited by 384 publications

References 17 publications

The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion

The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion

How to Insult and Compliment a Testifier

Justification as ‘Would-Be’ Knowledge

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