<i>‘Ought’ and Resolution Semantics</i>*

Cariani, Fabrizio

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00839.x

Cited by 63 publications

(64 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…The kind of constraints that different views about normative ⁷ See Parfit (2001) for the standard account of externalism about reasons. ⁸ Broome (2007) and Cariani (2013) discuss the uses of 'ought' in great depth. A standardly used, but problematic, semantics for 'ought' is given by standard deontic logic.…”

Section: Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity

Reisner¹

2015

Weighing and Reasoning

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Section: Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity

Reisner¹

2015

Weighing and Reasoning

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“…This is sometimes claimed to be an advantage of EU accounts (e.g., by Lassiter 2011). 41 But 40 See also von Fintel 2012 for discussion and see Cariani 2013 for an alleged counterexample. While we feel the pull of Cariani's example, we hasten to point out that isolated counterexamples to the entailment we discuss can be easily accommodate via embedded implicatures.…”

Section: Deontic Modals As Measures Of Expected Utility?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Probability and implicatures: A unified account of the scalar effects of disjunction under modals

Santorio

Romoli

2017

S&P

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“…As (1), (3) and (5) illustrate, it might be perfectly natural to say that someone ought to do something while denying that he must, but as witnessed by (4) and (6), the reverse is problematic.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Must’, ‘Ought’ and the Structure of Standards

Björnsson

Shanklin

2014

Deontic Logic and Normative Systems

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Abstract. This paper concerns the semantic difference between strong and weak necessity modals. First we identify a number of explananda: their wellknown intuitive difference in strength between 'must' and 'ought' as well as differences in connections to probabilistic considerations and acts of requiring and recommending. Here we argue that important extant analyses of the semantic differences, though tailored to account for some of these aspects, fail to account for all. We proceed to suggest that the difference between 'ought' and 'must' lies in how they relate to scalar and binary standards. Briefly put, must(φ) says that among the relevant alternatives, φ is selected by the relevant binary standard, whereas ought(φ) says that among the relevant alternatives, φ is selected by the relevant scale. Given independently plausible assumptions about how standards are provided by context, this explains the relevant differences discussed.

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*‘Ought’ and Resolution Semantics**

Cited by 63 publications

References 36 publications

Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity

Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity

Probability and implicatures: A unified account of the scalar effects of disjunction under modals

‘Must’, ‘Ought’ and the Structure of Standards

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